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Article
Litigating the Right to Health under Occupation:
Between Bureaucracy and Humanitarianism
Aeyal Gross
INTRODUCTION
The increasing role of litigation in the protection of the right
to health has evoked great interest in recent years.1 In addition
to the increase in domestic and international litigation,2 the
examination of access to health care from a human rights
perspective is also clearly rising.3 This growing attention to

Aeyal Gross is Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University. I am grateful to
the World Health Organization for the funding for this research, to Dani Filc,
Paul Hunt, Michal Luft, Yael Ronen, and Anita Vitullo for their comments on a
previous draft of the article, and to Idan Seger for his excellent and dedicated
research work. Special thanks to Physicians for Human Rights – Israel and
especially to Mor Efrat for their help during the research. Special thanks to
Batya Stein for her excellent editing work. Responsibility for all interpretations
and translations of Israeli laws and cases remain with the author.
1. See COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M.
Brinks eds., 2008); LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE
JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011); THE RIGHT
TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY
(Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) [hereinafter
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH]; Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Litigating the Right
to Health: What Can We Learn from a Comparative Law and Health Care
Approach, 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 62 (2014); Aeyal Gross, The Right to
Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization: National and International
Perspectives, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 289, 291
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, eds., Hart Publishing, 2007) [hereinafter
The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization]; Hans V.
Hogerzeil et al., Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfillment of the
Right to Health Enforceable Through the Courts?, 368 LANCET 305 (2006);
Symposium, Legislating and Litigating Health Care Rights Around the World,
33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 636 (2005).
2. Regarding the right to health at the level of international law, see JOHN
TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); JONATHAN
WOLFF, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 94 (2012); Susan Marks & Andrew
Clapham, Health, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 197 (2005).
3. For a description of the processes involved in the growing turn to the
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litigation has focused on access to health care within domestic
settings, raising questions about the setting of priorities,
rationing, decision-making, and so forth.
This Article looks at another context of litigation, involving
residents of an occupied territory in the courts of law of the
occupying power. Specifically, it considers the right to health of
Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) as
discussed in Israeli courts, a setting distinct from the discussion
in the current literature on health rights litigation—one that
raises unique questions.
This Article begins with the frame of its discussion. First,
the OPT is defined as including the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. After the Israeli “disengagement” in 2005, questions about
the status of the Gaza Strip and whether it is still occupied have
been a controversial subject. This Article uses the approach
developed in the Author’s other writings: so long as Israel
exercises even partial control over Gaza, it continues to be
responsible as the occupier, at least functionally, for all matters
over which it has control.4 As for East Jerusalem, although
Israel has extended its law, administration, and jurisdiction to
it,5 this unilateral annexation has not been internationally
recognized and the area is considered part of the OPT, despite
its sui generis situation as the only place in the OPT where
Israeli law is applied to Palestinians. This Article will, therefore,
address some cases regarding East Jerusalem, notwithstanding
the different legal framework.
Even within the West Bank, however, the operation of the
right to health and the reasons for them, see Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross,
Marrying Human Rights and Health Care Systems: Contexts for Power to
Improve Access and Equity, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 1, at 2–4.
4. For a detailed discussion of the debate regarding Gaza and for an
elaboration of the functional approach, see AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE
WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 52–264 (2017).
See also Aeyal Gross, Rethinking Occupation: The Functional Approach, OPINIO
JURIS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/23/rethinking-occupationthe-functional-approach. The ICRC has recently adapted a limited version of a
functional approach. Int’l. Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on the
First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd edition, 2016, ¶¶
116–23 (Mar. 22, 2016). See also (Re)-Introducing the Functional Approach to
Occupation, GAZA GATEWAY (Dec. 15, 2015), http://gisha.org/en-blog/2015/12/
15/re-introducing-the-functional-approach-to-occupation/.
5. See Law and Administration Order (no.1), 5727–1967, KT 2064 p. 2690
(Isr.). See also Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740–1980, SH No. 980
p. 186. For a discussion, see EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OCCUPATION, 203–06 (2012).
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Palestinian Authority (PA) alongside Israel, the occupying
power, complicates the situation. Health is one of the matters
that are generally under PA jurisdiction. While his article does
not deal with the period that preceded the Oslo Agreements
(1967–1994) when Israel, as occupier, administered significant
aspects of the health care system in the OPT directly,6 some of
the patterns from that period, however, are still relevant and
deserve mention. One is the creation of two different standards
of care—one for Israeli settlers who have access to the Israeli
health care system, and a separate, substandard for
Palestinians in the OPT.7 In the latter, the emphasis is on access
to public health and a certain level of primary care, with more
expensive tertiary care provided by Israeli hospitals on a limited
scale. This creates ongoing dependence on Israel for
sophisticated forms of treatment. Since patients require the
approval of the Israeli secret service to enter Israel for health
care, the need to refer Palestinian patients for treatment to
Israel has turned into an instrument of control for the
occupation forces.8
The shift in the context of health is part of a more general
shift in the patterns of the Israeli occupation in the wake of the
Oslo accords—maintaining control while bearing less
responsibility.9 Dani Filc, a politics and government professor at
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, points out the problematic
nature of the agreement that transferred health care
responsibilities from Israel to the PA.10 The PA was made
responsible for health care, but Israel retained power and
authority over elements crucial to it, such as freedom of

6. For a discussion of this period, see Neve Gordon & Dani Filc, The
Destruction of Risk Society and the Ascendancy of Hamas, in THE POWER OF
INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION: ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINE TERRITORIES 457, 461–66 (Adi Ophir et al. eds., 2009); Yithak Sever
& Yitzhak Peterburg, Israel’s Development and Provision of Health Services to
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 1967-1994, in SEPARATE AND
COOPERATE, COOPERATE AND SEPARATE: THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE
PALESTINE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FROM ISRAEL AND ITS EMERGENCE AS AN
INDEPENDENT SYSTEM 41–56 (Tamara Barnea & Rafiq Husseini eds., 2002);
HADAS ZIV, A LEGACY OF INJUSTICE 20–25 (Shaul Miri Weingarten ed., Vardi
& Miri Weingarten trans., 2002), http://cdn4.phr.org.il/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/A-Legacy-of-Injustice.pdf.
7. DANI FILC, CIRCLES OF EXCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN
ISRAEL 132 (2009).
8. Id. at 133–34.
9. See GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264.
10. FILC, supra note 7, at 152.
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movement both within the West Bank and Gaza and between
these two parts of the OPT.11
This situation, as Filc notes, left the PA with limited powers
regarding the movement of patients as well as other issues such
as, for example, the determination of venues for Palestinian
doctors to specialize.12 Filc argues that the Ministry of Health
established under the PA lacked the resources and the political
power necessary for replacing the fragmented health system
inherited from the Israeli occupation and tried instead to become
a regulator.13 As a result of the legacy of the occupation and of
policies adopted by the PA, Palestinians in the OPT remained
dependent on Israel and other countries for the provision of
tertiary health care. This dependence entailed dire
consequences, especially with the growing restrictions that have
been placed on freedom of movement since the Second Intifada
in the early 2000s.14 Other such restrictions, especially in
relation to the separation of Gaza from the West Bank and of
both the West Bank and Gaza from East Jerusalem, are still an
issue at present. In the Oslo agreement, Israel also ensured that
the PA would bear exclusive responsibility for funding the
hospitalization of Palestinian patients in Israel.15
The Palestinian health system has been described as being
“in a state of chronic crisis,” with shortages of medication and
medical equipment alongside a shortfall in specialist doctors and
medical staff in general.16 The ways that Israeli control over the
OPT is related to this crisis have been documented and will not
be analyzed here in detail.17 Emphasis should be placed,
however, on the Palestinian health system’s economic
dependence on Israel, which results from the continued Israeli
control of Palestinian tax money as well as on other, more
specific, factors: the dependence on referrals to Israel,18 Israel’s
control of the pharmaceutical market through economic
11. Id. For a discussion of the health arrangements under the Oslo Acoords,
see Gordon & Filc, supra note 6, at 466–67. See also ZIV, supra note 6, at 26-37.
12. FILC, supra note 7, at 138–39.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 139–40; 143–46.
15. ZIV, supra note 6, at 31.
16. MON EFRAT, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS – ISRAEL, DIVIDE &
CONQUER: INEQUALITY IN HEALTH 7 (Reut Katz ed., G. Daniel & Dena BugelShunra trans., 2015), http://cdn3.phr.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DivideAnd-Conquer.pdf.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 42–43.
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agreements,19 limitations on the development of Palestinian
medical professionals by denying students entry to Jerusalem
for clinical training,20 and quotas on teams from the West Bank
allowed to work in East Jerusalem.21 Further factors are the
limitations on patient mobility,22 discussed below in detail, as
well as on ambulance mobility23 and, more generally, the effects
of violence and imprisonment on the health of Palestinians.24
This Article only addresses issues touching on access to
health care, although this aspect does certainly not exhaust the
right to health.25 The “medicalization” of the right to health,
referring to the focus on health care rather than on social
determinants of health such as education, nutrition, and
housing, has indeed been criticized.26 Nonetheless, this Article
will not address important issues that are not directly related to
access to health care, such as the effects of the occupation’s
discriminatory policies and the stress on more general
determinants of OPT residents’ health.27 Although those
questions are obviously critical, this Article is not an exhaustive

19. Id. at 44–45. See ORLY ALMI, WHO PROFITS, CAPTIVE ECONOMY: THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION (2012),
http://www.whoprofits.org/sites/default/files/captive_economy_0.pdf.
20. EFRAT, supra note 16, at 45–47.
21. Id. at 46–47.
22. See id. at 47–48.
23. See id. at 48–49.
24. See id. at 50–51.
25. See The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization,
supra note 1.
26. To look at “medicalization” in this context, see Benjamin M. Meier, The
World Health Organization, the Evolution of Human Rights, and the Failure to
Achieve Health for All, in GLOBAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, 163–89 (John Harrington & Maria Stuttaford
eds., 2010). For the discussion on social determinants, see generally WORLD
HEALTH ORG. COMM’N. ON SOC. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, CLOSING THE GAP
IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (2008), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf; Audrey R. Chapman, The Social Determinants of
Health, Health Equity and Human Rights, 12 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 17 (2010);
Katarina Tomasevski, Health Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 125, 126 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995).
27. For the discussion on the influence of discrimination on health, see
Nancy Krieger, Discrimination and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 36 (Lisa
Berkman et al. eds., 2000). For the discussion on the effect of stress caused by
discrimination on health, see Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice and Discrimination as
Social Stressors, in THE HEALTH OF SEXUAL MINORITIES: PUBLIC HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER POPULATIONS 242
(Ilan H. Meyer & Mary Northridge eds., 2007).
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study of the fulfillment (or lack thereof) of the OPT’s residents
right to health,28 but of the role that litigation in Israeli courts
has played in addressing this right and, specifically, the aspects
of it pertaining to access to health care.
Part I of this Article outlines the normative framework
relevant to the discussion. Part II focuses on freedom of
movement, the issue identified as crucial in the litigation
affecting access to health care. Part III deals with the protection
of civilians and medical teams during hostilities. The
conclusions sum up the various topics discussed, showing how
Israeli case law on the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT
is almost entirely lacking in any references to the right to health
as a human right in international law and turns only rarely to
the specific obligations under International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). These lacunae are pointed out in the argumentation
adopted by the courts especially, but not only, in the Gaza cases:
Israeli courts often deal with access to health care by
Palestinians from the OPT as mainly a humanitarian issue (not
in the sense of binding obligations from IHL but in the sense of
a humanitarian gesture) rather than as a matter raising
questions of rights and duties.
I. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A number of legal sources are relevant to the right to health
in the OPT. The first is IHL, which is applicable in occupied
territories.29 While the Geneva Conventions include provisions
on the protection of the health of combatants who are sick or
injured,30 the present Article focuses on the protection of the
28. For some of these issues, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT
ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH CONDITIONS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORY (OPT) (2015), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/
international/wbgs/opt_field_assessment_health_conditions_1april2015.pdf.
For social and economic determinants of health in the context of the OPT, see
EFRAT, supra note 16, at 10–18.
29. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter The
Fourth Geneva Convention].
30. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 12, 15, 19–20, 24, 26,35,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention].
OF A FIELD
PALESTINIAN
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right to health of civilians living in an occupied territory. The
relevant IHL provisions are thus found mostly in the Fourth
Geneva Convention (GCIV) dealing with the protection of
civilians, which includes provisions entitling “protected
persons”31 to “respect for their persons,”32 the requirement of
“particular protection and respect” for the wounded, sick and
infirm,33 duties concerning the removal of the wounded, sick,
and infirm from besieged or encircled areas and the passage of
medical personnel and equipment to such areas,34 the protection
of civilian hospitals and their personnel,35 of convoys conveying
wounded and sick civilians,36 and the free passage of all
consignments of medical and hospital stores.37 While these
provisions are relevant to the protection of civilians any time the
GCIV is triggered (meaning situations of armed conflict and/or
occupation), some apply specifically in occupation and are thus
of special relevance, reflecting the broader duties of the
occupying power controlling the territory. Thus, an occupier has
the duty of “ensuring the . . . medical supplies of the population,”
including bringing in “medical stores and other articles if the
resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”38 Moreover,
the occupying power has the duty “of ensuring and maintaining,
with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the
medical and hospital establishment and services, public health
and hygiene in the occupied territory,” to allow for medical
personnel of all categories to carry on their duties,39 and for
National Red Cross Societies to pursue their activities.40 If the
population in the occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the
occupying power shall agree to relief schemes and shall facilitate
31. Palestinians living in the OPT are protected persons in the sense
defined in The Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 29, art 4.
32. Id. art. 27. See Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts arts. 10-11, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977)
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I
but is bound by the parts of it that are considered as customary international
law.
33. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, art. 16.
34. Id. art. 17.
35. Id. arts. 18-20; Additional Protocol I, supra note 32, arts. 12–29.
36. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, arts. 21–22.
37. Id. art. 23.
38. Id. art. 55.
39. Id. art. 56. For related provisions, see id. art. 57.
40. Id. art. 63.
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them, including the provision of medical supplies.41 These
provisions reflect the overall responsibility of an occupying
power for access to health care in an occupied territory.
Several questions arise regarding the application of these
provisions and the duties they entail in the context discussed in
this article. The first relates to Israel’s position stating that
GCIV does not apply to the OPT given that, before 1967, the area
was not part of a state party to GCIV.42 Israel took this position
after 1967 while declaring that it would de facto act in
accordance with the Convention’s humanitarian provisions.43
This position, however, has been widely rejected, including by
the International Court of Justice,44 and this article, therefore,
assumes that GCIV applies to the OPT. The second question
touches on the scope of Israel’s duties after the Oslo Accords,
which transferred health from Israel, the occupying power, to
the PA, giving rise to complex questions about the division of
duties regarding access to health care in the OPT.45 This article,
as noted, endorses a functional approach stating that Israel
bears full responsibility whenever its actions affect the OPT
residents’ access to health care. Moreover, according to the Oslo
Agreements, Israel retained its overall responsibilities as
occupier,46 even if some of the authority was “outsourced” to the
41. See id. art. 59, 60–61. For a discussion of some of these duties, see
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 355-74, 399-547 (2009). YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 187-90, 191-94 (2009).
42. See Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the
Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 263 (1971).
43. Id.
44. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 101 (July 9).
For a discussion of the arguments dismissing the Israeli positions, see GROSS,
supra note 4, at 136-264.
45. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (DOP), Isr.-PLO, art. 6, Sept. 13, 1993, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm
[hereinafter Oslo Accords]; GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 43-44
(2000).
46. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45, art. 6. For a discussion, see WATSON,
supra note 45, at43–44. Joel Singer, the legal advisor to the Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs during the signing of the Oslo Accords, emphasized that the
status of the West Bank and Gaza was not to be changed, notwithstanding the
transfer to the Palestinian Authority (PA) of certain powers and responsibilities
previously exercised by Israel. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45, art. 4
(determining that both sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single
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PA meaning that, should the latter not fulfill the right to health
where it is acting, Israel could still be held responsible.47 This is
a significant issue given the many cases pertaining to
restrictions on exit from the OPT to enter Israel, or to travel from
Israel to other countries when adequate health care is
unavailable in the OPT. Israel’s responsibility under IHL (as
well as under human rights law, as addressed below) derives
from its overall responsibility as the occupier as well as from its
specific actions, which control the life and movement of the
occupied population and thus their access to health care.
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Besides IHL, international human rights law also applies.
Current international law analysis assumes that human rights
standards apply extraterritorially, that is, a state is bound by
these standards not only in its actions within its own territory
but also beyond it.48 This view is supported by the growing
territorial unit whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period).
Article 6 of Annex 2 to the same declaration determined that, other than the
agreed arrangements, the status of Gaza and Jericho (where Palestinian selfrule was first implemented) would continue to be an integral part of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and would not be changed in the interim period. Id.
annex 2, art. 2. Identical declarations appear in Articles XXX.8 and XI.1. of the
Interim Agreement. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and
the
Gaza
Strip,
Isr.-PLO,
Sept.
28,
1995,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israelipalestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx.
See
also
Agreement
on
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Isr.-PLO, art. 13(5), Aug.
29, 1994, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/agreement
%20on%20preparatory%20transfer%20of%20powers%20and%20re.aspx
(determining that the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area would continue to be an
integral part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that the status of the
West Bank would not be changed for the period of the agreement and nothing
in the agreement would be construed as changing this status); Joel Singer,
Aspects of Foreign Relations under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, 28 ISR. L.
REV. 268, 274 (1994); Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements: Some Legal Aspects, 1 JUSTICE MAG. 4, 6 (1994).
47. On the need to hold Israel responsible for the Palestinians’ health
status and access to health care, see FILC, supra note 7, at 152.
48. See MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES (2011); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2012); Maastricht
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (2011), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/mainnavigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid
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international jurisprudence on the human rights duties of states
occupying territory beyond their borders or otherwise exercising
extraterritorial control. Given that the context of the present
discussion is of an armed conflict and occupation, it also merits
note that most courts, tribunals, treaty bodies, and scholars
addressing this matter currently hold that human rights norms
apply alongside IHL.49 Despite the complex relationship
between these sets of duties,50 obligations stemming from the
right to health are clearly applicable in this situation given the
scope and duration of Israel’s control in both the West Bank and
Gaza. Questions may certainly arise concerning the duties of a
belligerent or occupying power that derive from social and
economic rights such as, whether a belligerent or short-term
occupier (unlike Israel) can be considered as lacking capabilities
to develop an extensive healthcare or welfare system in the
external territory under its control.51 Yet, these issues are not
%5D=23, [hereinafter Maastricht Principles].
49. This position has been taken by the International Court of Justice
concerning armed conflict in general. E.g. Case Concerning Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 168, ¶ 178 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
¶¶ 102–14 (July 9) (specifically concerning occupation); Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July
8). The same position has been taken by the European Court of Justice in a few
of its judgments, notably in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/ 07,
53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 ¶¶ 90–91, 131–38 (2011). This position has also been
taken by the Israel Supreme Court in some of its cases, such as HCJ 769/02
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, ¶ 18 (December
14, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). A similar
view was expressed by the U.N. Treaty Bodies. See Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval
Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2004); Aeyal Gross, Human Proportions: Are
Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of
Occupation? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Aeyal Gross, The Righting of the Law
of Occupation, in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016);
Noam Lubell, Human Rights in Military Occupations, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
317 (2012); YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 41, at 399–547. The literature
on this topic is extensive, and these are only a few examples.
50. For a discussion of the relationship in the context of the right to health,
see Sylvain Vite, The Interrelation of the Law of Occupation and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: The Examples of Food, Health, and Property, 90
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 629 (2008).
51. See Lubell, supra note 49, at 322. Lubell points out how, in the context
of occupation, practical and legal impossibilities may play a part in an occupier’s
limited ability to implement human rights obligations in the same manner it
does domestically. He suggests that, although the starting point is the
presupposition of a need to meet the entire range of obligations, the contextual
circumstances should be taken into account in determining the obligations that
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relevant to the duties touching on international human rights
law discussed in this Article. Generally, differences may be
expected between a state’s domestic duties in relation to social
and economic rights and those it bears extraterritorially, which
can vary with the circumstances. As for the OPT, the scope and
duration of Israel’s control translate into extensive obligations.
Concerning a state’s extraterritorial obligations, questions may
arise as to its positive obligations to fulfill the right, proactively
engaging in activities that ensure its enjoyment. The length and
extent of Israel’s control, however, do appear to generate
obligations to fulfill the right or, at the very least, a negative
obligation to respect the right. Most of the instances discussed
below indeed address the latter obligation, as could be expected
given the existence of the PA and the fact that Israel is no longer
involved in the provision of health services in the OPT, with the
exception of East Jerusalem.52
Particularly important for the discussion of the right to
health from an international human rights law perspective is
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights. Article 12 determines that each state
recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health,” detailing
the steps needed to realize this right, including the prevention,
treatment, and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and
apply in each individual case. Id. Territorial control, including occupation, does
trigger the applicability of the full range of human rights obligations a state
must uphold. The substantive elements of the obligation and the assessment of
whether a violation has occurred, however, must be determined in light of the
factual and legal contexts, including issues of logistical ability to act or
restrictions on the occupying power in the occupation regime. Cf. the discussion
of the obligation to fulfill the right to food during occupation in Aeyal Gross &
Tamar Feldman, “We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word ‘Calories”: Rethinking Food
Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the Gaza Closure,
33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 379 (2015).
52. For a discussion of the typology of obligations, see Maastricht
Principles, supra note 48, which addresses the “obligation to avoid causing
harm” (Principle 13), but also the obligation of occupying states or states that
otherwise exercise effective control over territory outside their territories to
respect, protect, and fulfill the economic, social, and cultural rights of persons
within that territory (Principle 18). See generally Comm. on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State Parties’
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant) on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (1991); Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights) on Its Twenty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14].
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other diseases and the creation of conditions that would assure
medical attention and services to all in the event of sickness.53
General Comment 14 of the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, which is the official interpretation
of Article 12, is a key attempt to infuse concrete substance into
the right to health. Four major principles that emerge from the
General Comment are relevant to the subjects discussed in this
article:54
(a) Availability: The state must have an adequate amount of
existing health facilities, products, services, and programs.55
The precise nature of these features will fluctuate in accordance
with varying circumstances, including the state’s level of
development.56 In any event, they include the background
conditions for health, such as water and sanitation, hospitals,
clinics, trained medical staff, and essential drugs.57
(b) Accessibility: All health facilities, products, and services
must be equally accessible to all, without any discrimination.58
There are four overlapping aspects to accessibility. (1) A
prohibition on discrimination, especially against the most
vulnerable and marginalized sectors of the population.59
(2) Physical accessibility to all sectors of the population,
especially vulnerable and marginalized groups such as
minorities, women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and HIV
and AIDS carriers and patients.60 (3) Economic accessibility to
all. The system of payment for health services, as well as for
services related to background conditions for health, must be
based on a principle of equity and must guarantee that these
services, whether privately or publicly provided, are accessible
to everyone, especially socially underprivileged groups.61 Equity
mandates that the health expenditure burden borne by poor

53. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.
12, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–19, 6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967).
See also The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization, supra
note 1.
54. See generally The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and
Globalization, supra note 1.
55. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(a).
56. Id.
57. See BRIGIT C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–16 (2001) (discussing “availability” in this sense).
58. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(b).
59. Id. ¶ 12(b)(i).
60. Id. ¶ 12(b)(ii).
61. Id. ¶ 12(b)(iii).
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households not be disproportionate to that borne by wealthier
households.62 (4) Accessibility to information—the right to
request, receive, and provide information and ideas on health
issues, subject to the right to personal medical confidentiality.63
(c) Acceptability: All health facilities, products, and services
must abide by medical ethics and be sensitive to and respectful
of the communities, gender differences, confidentiality, and the
duty to improve the health status of all those concerned.64
(d) Quality: All health facilities, products, and services must
be suitable for their purpose and of a good medical and scientific
quality.65 To this end, amongst other things, skilled medical
teams, drugs, and scientifically approved hospital equipment, as
well as clean and potable water and adequate sanitation are
necessary.66
The extent to which Israel, the occupying power, can de facto
sustain these principles depends on the noted division between
its own powers and those of the PA. Even adopting the position
that the occupying power bears full responsibility on this matter
notwithstanding the role of the PA, many of the litigated cases
have in fact dealt with accessibility—a central pillar of the right
to health. Yet, whereas much of domestic litigation on the right
to health (in Israel and elsewhere), deals with financial
accessibility, many of the cases relating to the OPT deal with
physical accessibility when limited because of restrictions on
freedom of movement within and outside the OPT, as discussed
in detail in Part III below. When Israel’s actions restrict access
to health care, it is responsible for violating the right of OPT
Palestinians. The Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) has
referred to the international human right to health in cases
dealing with access to health care in Israel for Israeli residents,67
but not in the cases dealing with OPT residents discussed in this
Article. In some cases, the reason is the HCJ’s reliance on more
specific provisions of IHL, and in others, the HCJ’s general
tendency to eschew matters of principle altogether in favor of a
search for pragmatic solutions. The significance of this absence

62. Id.
63. Id. ¶ 12(b)(iv); The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and
Globalization, supra note 1, at 301.
64. See General Comment 14, supra note 52, ¶ 12(c).
65. Id. ¶ 12(d).
66. Id. See also TOEBES, supra note 57, at 112.
67. See, e.g., HCJ 3071/05 Gila Luzon v. Israel ¶ 11 (July 28, 2008), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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of human rights analysis will become apparent below.
C. ISRAELI LAW
Israeli law does not apply in the OPT. In cases involving the
Israeli army, however, the HCJ has pointed out the army’s
obligation to act in accordance with the standards of Israeli
administrative law.68 Yet, this view pertains to general
principles. The limited recognition of the right to health in
Israeli constitutional law69 did not affect the litigation relating
to the Palestinians’ right to health. One critical aspect, discussed
in the next section, is the exclusion of Palestinians residing in
the OPT from the Israeli National Health Insurance Law.
D. EXCLUSION FROM ISRAELI NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
LAW
The exclusion of Palestinian residents of the OPT (except for
East Jerusalem) from the Israeli National Health Insurance
Law (NHIL) is another aspect where the implementation of the
right to health reflects the structure of the occupation as a whole,
especially since the NHIL applies in personam to Israeli settlers
living in the OPT. Personal application of Israeli law to settlers
works in a myriad of ways.70 Concerning the NHIL, Emergency
Regulations issued by the Israeli government and regularly
renewed through legislation71 determine that, for the purpose of
certain Israeli statutes, including the NHIL, people who live in
68. Id.
69. Aeyal Gross, In Search of the Right to Health in Israeli Constitutional
Law, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 311 (Gideon Sapir,
Daphne Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak eds., 2013); Aeyal Gross, The Right to
Health in Israel Between Solidarity and Neoliberalism, in THE RIGHT TO
HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 159,
163 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014).
70. See GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264. See also ACRI, ONE RULE—TWO
LEGAL SYSTEMS: ISRAEL’S REGIME OF LAWS IN THE WEST BANK (2014),
http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Two-Systems-of-LawEnglish-FINAL.pdf; EYAL BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INTO ISRAEL 3-32 (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press
1990); BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 233-38.
71. Law for the Extension of Emergency Regulations (Judea, Samaria and
the Gaza Strip—Judging for Offences and Legal Aid), 5727-1967, SH No. 517 p.
20 (Isr.); Law for the Extension of Emergency Regulations (Judea and
Samaria—Judging for Offences and Legal Aid), 5772-2012, SH No. 2365 p. 476
(Isr.).
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the OPT will be considered residents of Israel if they are Israeli
citizens or are “entitled to immigrate to Israel under the Law of
Return” (that is, Jews and family members of Jews).72 This
provision is critical because the NHIL regularly applies only to
residents of Israel, and the OPT (except for East Jerusalem) is,
legally, not part of Israel. The net result is a different set of
rights and duties applying to different groups in the OPT along
ethnic lines, including access to health care. The story of health
care is thus one of the building blocks in the continued Israeli
control of the OPT, which is typified by a de facto annexation
that includes settling citizens of Israel in the OPT (contra
GCIV)73 without annexing the territory and without granting its
Palestinian residents the same rights enjoyed by the Israeli
Jewish settlers.74 Another aspect of health care reflecting the
main features of this occupation is freedom of movement.
Restrictions on this freedom are one of this occupation’s most
salient features, and a great deal of the litigation on the right to
health in the OPT touches on it. Freedom of movement is thus
the topic of the next section.
II. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
A. BACKGROUND
A brief account of freedom of movement in the OPT is
required here to clarify the background of the restrictions
imposed on it and their effect on health care that can, in a way,
sum up the story of the occupation. Ariel Handel, a researcher
at Tel Aviv University, argues that the spatial conflict in
Israel/Palestine is not over land units but over the very
possibility of using the space.75 His suggestion is that any map
72. Article 1 of the 1950 Law of Return gives Jews the right to immigrate
to Israel. Article 4B defines as a Jew a person who was born to a Jewish mother
or who has converted to Judaism and is not a member of another religion. The
right is also granted to children, grandchildren, and spouses of Jews, and to
spouses of children and grandchildren of Jews, unless they were born Jews and
willingly converted to another religion (Article 4A). Law of Return, 5710-1950,
4 LSI 114 (1950).
73. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 29, art. 49(6).
74. GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–264.
75. Ariel Handel, Where, Where To, and When in the Occupied Territories:
An Introduction to Geography of Disaster, in THE POWER OF INCLUSIVE
EXCLUSION; ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES 179, 181 (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni & Sari Hanafi eds., 2009).
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of the spatial state of affairs in the OPT represents only the
principle of temporariness and contingency, pointing to
indeterminacy concerning how to travel and how long it will
take.76 This dimension of the occupation can obviously affect
physical access to health care and the litigation on these matters
has accordingly changed over the years.
In 1967, the Israeli Cabinet approved the plan of the then
Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan
for
an
“invisible
administration,” meaning “open bridges” between the West
Bank and Jordan as well as free movement between the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and between the OPT and Israel.77 A
general exit permit was accordingly issued in 1972, allowing
OPT residents to enter Israel without individual permits.78 The
first restrictions on this permit were imposed in 1989, two years
after the outbreak of the First Intifada.79 Palestinians from Gaza
working in Israel were required to carry a magnetic card that
contained updated information on their “security history” and on
the payment of taxes and utilities, which was to be renewed
annually.80 On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, however, as part of
Israel’s “security measures,” the general exit permit was
canceled and each resident of the OPT wanting to enter Israel
was required to obtain an individual permit,81 though the
prohibition of Palestinians entering Israel was fully enforced
only from March 1993.82 In 1995, the Brodet Committee
recommended that the Palestinians’ entry into Israel be made
conditional on security checks and on increased law enforcement
measures against those entering without a permit and against
their employers.83 In the same year, the magnetic card policy
76. On the bureaucratic regime regarding movement, see YAEL BERDA, THE
BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION: THE PERMITS REGIME IN THE WEST BANK
2000–2006 (2012). See also YAEL BERDA, LIVIING EMERGENCY: ISRAEL’S PERMIT
REGIME IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK (Stanford University Press 2017);
Gordon & Filc, supra note 6, at 469–72.
77. Ariel Handel, Chronology of the Occupation Regime 1967–2007, in THE
POWER OF INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION; ANATOMY OF ISRAELI RULE IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 603, 605 (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni & Sari Hanafi
eds., 2009).
78. Although the permit was not in force 1:00–5:00 AM, many Palestinians
workers remained in Israel through the night. Id. at 608.
79. GROSS, supra note 4, at 256.
80. See Handel, supra note 77, at 617.
81. That was also the first time that Israel declared a full closure of the
OPT for forty-one days. Id. at 618.
82. Id. at 619.
83. GROSS, supra note 4, at 256–57.
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was extended to Palestinians from the West Bank as well.84 In
1996, following a wave of terrorist attacks, comprehensive
closure as well as an internal closure were imposed on the OPT.85
After 1993, following the Oslo Accords that divided the OPT into
various areas according to the degree of Israeli or PA control and
declared the settlements out of bounds for Palestinians, further
restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinians were
imposed within the OPT.86 To provide for the settlers’ security
and, in fact, for their “right” to travel without having to go
through Palestinian-controlled areas, “bypass roads” were built
for the sole use of settlers.87 In 2000, at the beginning of the
Second Intifada, Israel banned Palestinians from entering Israel
and closed the “safe passage” between the West Bank and Gaza,
the Rafah Crossing, and the international airport in Gaza.88 In
2001, Israel imposed serious restrictions on travel within the
West Bank, including “encirclements” of all Palestinian cities
preventing entry and exit of private vehicles and followed by
barriers stopping vehicles from crossing into Israel from the
West Bank.89 In 2002, Israel began to issue internal travel
permits within the West Bank to allow entry through the
encirclements it had imposed.90 This period was typified by the
dissection of the OPT into many and frequently changing “land
cells,” with many checkpoints within the West Bank and with
passage between areas becoming slow, unpredictable, and
nearly impossible.91 Palestinians wasted much time in their
travels without knowing whether and when they would arrive at
their destination.92 These restrictions undermine the
Palestinians’ ability to work, produce, sell, and keep in touch,93
84. Handel, supra note 77, at 620.
85. Id. at 621.
86. See Oslo Accords, supra note 45.
87. See Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network
in the West Bank, The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 221 (1997). See also AHRON BREGMAN, CURSED VICTORY: A
HISTORY OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 183–84 (2014); ELISHA
EFRAT, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP: A GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION AND
DISENGAGEMENT 80-86 (2006).
88. Handel, supra note 77, at 624.
89. Id. at 625.
90. Id.
91. Handel, supra note 75, at 182–84. See also Sari Hanafi, Spacio-cide:
Colonial Politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory,
2 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 106 (2009); BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 238–39.
92. Handel, supra note 75, at 191.
93. Id. at 193.
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as well as their access to health care.
Restrictions also hinder the entry of ambulances and make
access to more sophisticated health care facilities extremely
difficult. Chronically ill patients and pregnant women have been
particularly affected, including several reported cases of women
losing their babies because of delays at checkpoints during
labor.94
The building of the wall in the West Bank beginning in
200395 led to further restrictions on freedom of movement.96 This
period was also characterized by the growing separation of the
West Bank from Gaza, especially after the 2005
“disengagement,” when Israel pulled out settlers and a
permanent military presence from Gaza.97 After the
disengagement, Israel continued to control not only the
movement of people from Gaza into Israel but also attempted to
control movement between Gaza and Egypt via the Rafah
crossing—the only operational border crossing between Egypt
and Gaza.98 The agreement, Agreement on Movement and
Access (AMA): Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing,99 brokered
by the United States after the “disengagement” stated that the
PA was to operate the Rafah Crossing under the supervision of
EU monitors who would be present at the Crossing, and of
Israeli security officials who would oversee the operation via
video footage and supervision of the passengers list.100 The
94.
95.
96.
97.

FILC, supra note 7, at 144–45.
Handel, supra note 75, at 626.
FILC, supra note 7, at 148–49.
SARI BASHI & EITAN DIAMOND, SEPARATING LAND, SEPARATING
PEOPLE: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ACCESS RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN GAZA AND THE
WEST BANK 5 (2015).
98. Id.
99. Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza, Agreed
Principles for Rafah Crossing (APRC), Isr.-PA, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/files/Agreed%20Principles%20for%20Rafah%20
Crossing.pdf.
100. Id. Travel via Rafah would be restricted, with few exceptions, to
Palestinians registered in the Israeli-controlled Palestinian Population
Registry, with Israel reserving the right to block entry of Palestinian ID holders
it considered “terror activists.” Even in the “exceptional” categories—diplomats,
foreign visitors, foreign representatives of recognized international
organizations, and humanitarian cases—a foreigner’s ability to cross would be
subject to veto by Israel, which would have forty-eight hours to register its
objection. See SARI BASHI & KENNETH MANN, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS: THE
LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA 32-33 (2007). The author of this Article is a member of
the board of Gisha, was consulted on this report, and is acknowledged in it. The
positions expressed here, however, are only the author’s.
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Rafah Crossing was to be monitored by Israeli security officials
via cameras receiving video and data feed on its operation in real
time.101 Under these arrangements, then, foreigners could enter
Gaza only via the Israeli-controlled crossing at Erez, and the
Gazans’ possibilities of receiving family members, visiting
lecturers, professionals, businesspersons, and medical care
workers were all restricted and dependent on obtaining an entry
visa to Israel, as illustrated in some of the cases discussed
below.102
Under AMA, Israel also controlled all imports into Gaza.
Except for personal effects brought in by travelers, imports were
not permitted via air, sea, or the Rafah Crossing, and only goods
passing through and inspected in Israel could be brought in.103
The import of any goods into Gaza thus remained dependent on
Israel opening the crossings and on its regulations as to what
would be allowed through it, a closure entailing huge effects for
all aspects of life.104
The opening and closing of the crossings have fluctuated
over time. Regarding the Rafah Crossing, after Palestinians
attacked an Israeli military outpost at Kerem Shalom in June
2006 and captured Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier, Israel stopped
implementing the AMA and kept the Crossing mostly closed.105
After June 2007, when Hamas took control of the government in
the Gaza Strip, Israel froze implementation of the AMA.106 Ever
since, and given other changes instituted by the new Egyptian
government, the Crossing has remained mostly closed.107
Gazans have resorted to alternatives, such as breaches of the
border by Hamas,108 ad hoc Egypt-Hamas arrangements that led
101. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 33–36. An Israeli objection to the
entrance of a foreigner in one of the exceptional categories triggered a process
of consultations between Israeli, Palestinians, and EU representatives with
Israel making the final decision, even though the wording of the agreement
suggested that Israel’s role is advisory. Israeli consent was required for the
Rafah crossing to be open and Israel could close it, as it did at times, based on
what it considered security considerations. The European monitors would not
staff their positions in Rafah if Israel said it would not open the crossing because
of security reasons. See also NOGA KADMAN, RAFA CROSSING: WHO HOLDS THE
KEYS? 21–28 (2009).
102. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 35.
103. Id. at 41; KADMAN, supra note 101, at 27.
104. KADMAN, supra note 101, at 65–117.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 35–38.
108. Id. at 44–47.
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to unpredictable and irregular openings for brief periods in
response to pressures from both sides of the border,109 and the
use of tunnels dug under the Gaza-Egypt border.110
The fluid situation in Gaza is also related to political
developments within the PA. Hamas gained a majority in the
2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, ending the
Fatah dominance that had prevailed since the PA’s
establishment.111 In March 2007, a Hamas-led national unity
government was formed together with Fatah, the largest group
in the Palestine Liberation Organization.112 This alliance broke
down and, in June 2007, following its success in an armed
struggle with Fatah, Hamas assumed overall control of Gaza.113
As a result, PA President Abbas, a Fatah member, dismissed the
Hamas-led government and, ever since, the West Bank has been
under Fatah control and Gaza under Hamas.114 In the wake of
these developments, Israel imposed a closure on Gaza in 2007.115
Restrictions on the movement of people and goods in Gaza,
however, developed in several stages even before 2007. As
described, following the removal of the settlements and of the
military presence in 2005, Israel sustained its control of access
to and from Gaza via sea and air and, to a smaller extent,
through the Gaza-Egypt border.116 Nevertheless, Israel
proceeded to relate to Gaza as a foreign territory to which it owes
no responsibilities other than those mandated by the laws of
armed conflict.117 In 2006–2010, for example, the Rafah Crossing
with Egypt was closed almost entirely.118 As a result, approval
to cross the Gaza-Israel border was required in order to leave
Gaza to any destination.119 After it was opened in 2010 to
restricted traffic, an Israeli-approved identification card was

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 47–52.
Id. at 52–55.
BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 8–11.
Id.
Id.
See Iain Scobbie, Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 280 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
115. BASHI & MANN, supra note 100, at 8–11.
116. Id.
117. Sari Bashi, Controlling Perimeters, Controlling Lives: Israel and Gaza,
7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS, 243, 246-47 (2013) (shows how control over access is a
new form of bureaucratic control, typical of colonial and military regimes).
118. Id. at 252.
119. Id. at 252–53.
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still needed for passing.120 Passage to the West Bank, however,
remained under Israeli control which meant Palestinians who
were Gaza residents were not allowed to enter the West Bank
through the Israel-Jordan crossing even if they had made the
long detour from Gaza via Egypt and Jordan.121 As for goods,
prior to 2007, the restrictions had been implemented mostly by
closing the commercial crossings or restricting their opening
hours.122 In 2007, the government initiated a policy of
deliberately restricting the movement of goods solely to those
necessary for basic human needs.123 Given the additional naval
and aerial blockade imposed by Israel,124 restrictions on freedom
of movement to and from Gaza imposed by Israel are extensive.
The next section deals with the effect of freedom of movement
restrictions on health care.
B. CASES INVOLVING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS
TO HEALTH CARE
The review of issues relating to freedom of movement in the
OPT describing different stages and options of restrictions
highlights the centrality of this issue to the Israeli occupation
and, specifically, to physical access to health care.125 The
discussion in this section considers case law related to this topic.
The cases were divided into three categories that reflect
varieties of restrictions on freedom of movement: (1) issues
involving checkpoints and other restrictions within the OPT,
especially within the West Bank, (2) issues involving restrictions
caused by the wall, (3) issues involving exit permits (to Israel or
elsewhere) from the OPT. The third category is further divided
into three categories: cases involving exit of patients from the
West Bank and from Gaza before the disengagement, cases
involving exit of patients from Gaza after the disengagement,
and cases relating to the exit of medical staff and medical
students.126
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 259.
123. Id.
124. See generally Gross & Feldman, supra note 51 (discussing the
restriction of the movement of goods in connection to food security).
125. See Angelo Stefanini & Hadas Ziv, Occupied Palestinian Territory:
Linking Health to Human Rights, 8 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 160 (2004). See also
ZIV, supra note 6, at 38–56.
126. A case pre-dating the ones discussed below dealt with the provision of
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1. Checkpoints, Blockings, and “Encirclements”

Cases dealing with restrictions on freedom of movement
through the use of checkpoints in ways that affect access to
health care were especially prevalent at the height of the Second
Intifada, which erupted in 2000.127 A number of such cases
reached the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of
Justice (HCJ). Usually, the HCJ refrained from intervening, at
times seeing the petitions as too general and at times accepting
the army’s promises to ease the restrictions when access to
health care was involved.128
A few cases will serve as illustration. Even before most of
these cases were litigated, however, an earlier case dealing with
issues involving exit permits raised the question about
procedures regarding checkpoints. The petitioner in this case, as
in many others discussed in this Article, was the Israeli
non-governmental organization Physicians for Human Rights –
Israel (PHRI).129 When it first brought up the issue of the
checkpoints’ effect on access to health care, the state answered
that, following the petition, a new instruction/procedure had
been distributed.130 This new directive, dealing with West Bank
residents reaching a checkpoint during a medical emergency,
medical services during a curfew imposed in the OPT during the 1991 Gulf War.
The matter was obsolete by the time the judgment was given, but the HCJ
addressed some of the issues that emerged and determined that the movement
of doctors and patients during curfew should be specified in instructions to be
issued by the army in both Hebrew and Arabic, which should include full details
of modes of action available to patients or their families who would require
medical assistance while it was enforced. These instructions should be given to
soldiers staffing checkpoints and announced to the residents. HCJ 477/91 PHRI
v. Minister of Defense (Apr. 24, 1991), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(Isr.). In an additional case dealing with a curfew imposed in Hebron in 2003
following the murder of a Jewish settler, petitioners argued that Palestinian
residents had no access to essential medicines and health care. The HCJ held
that, when imposing a curfew, the army must take into account its effects on
the civilian population’s ability to maintain a reasonable life routine.
Nevertheless, it held that the curfew’s limitation to nights after a time and the
interruptions allowing residents access to food, medicines, and essential
services indicates that authority was exercised reasonably and the HCJ does
not need to intervene. HCJ 854/03 Sultan v. Commander of the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) in the West Bank (July 9, 2003), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
127. Stefanini & Ziv, supra note 125.
128. See infra Section II.B.1.
129. HCJ 9109/96 PHRI v. Minister of Defense (Mar. 23, 1998), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
130. See id. ¶¶ 19–21.
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was supposed to solve the matter. Yet, three years later, after
delays in checkpoints led pregnant women on the way to delivery
to lose their babies,131 the case reached the HCJ again. The
petition argued that the army had not implemented the
procedure agreed upon in the previous case.132 The petitioners
demanded that the procedure be internalized and that officers
who had not briefed soldiers about it as well as officers and
soldiers failing to comply with it be investigated and tried.133 In
its reply, the army admitted there had been a flaw and the
procedure presented to the HCJ had not been disseminated,
noting that an internal army investigation had concluded that
the reason for it could have been staff changes.134 An order was
issued to inform all soldiers of the procedure and to distribute it
at the checkpoints.135
With the eruption of the Second Intifada and the increasing
restrictions on movement within the West Bank, the problems
worsened and assumed new forms, especially concerning
unstaffed blockings that were challenged in various litigation
attempts. In March 2001, the HCJ rejected a petition of PHRI
after the army had placed checkpoints in the West Bank and
Gaza due to, as described by the HCJ, the “difficult security
situation occurring in these territories, as part of the army’s
attempts to prevent terrorist attacks.”136 The petitioners argued
that checkpoints that created closure or “encirclement” prevent
the provision of food, medicine, and health services to the
population.137 They also argued that, despite the army’s
commitment to enable emergency passage for medical purposes,
this procedure was not implemented and many emergency cases
had been forced to wait for a long time at checkpoints.138 Often,
they had not been allowed to pass at all and had been forced to
seek alternative routes.139 The HCJ refused to engage with this
131. ZIV, supra note 6, at 44–45.
132. HCJ 7517/99 Abed el Salem et al v. Minister of Defense (July 3, 2000),
¶ 2, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
133. Id. ¶¶ 3–5.
134. Id. ¶ 5.
135. HCJ 7517/99 Abed el Salem et al v. Minister of Defense (July 3, 2000),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
136. HCJ 9242/00 PHRI v. Minister of Defense (Mar. 21, 2001), ¶ 1, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
137. HCJ 7517/99 Abed el Salem v. Minister of Defense (July 3, 2000), ¶ 8,
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
138. Id. ¶ 25.
139. Id. ¶¶ 3–10.
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petition, holding that the petitioner had drawn a general picture
without any factual basis.140 It cited the army’s argument that,
under its own policies, each area must have at least one route
where soldiers are present.141 It further argued that, according
to military procedures that the soldiers were made aware of,
passage at these checkpoints should be allowed in all cases of
medical necessity.142 The army admitted there is no guarantee
that all soldiers at all checkpoints in all cases do comply with
these procedures.143 Violations of this procedure, however, if
any, should be reported, and the army will then take the
necessary measures.144 On these grounds, the HCJ rejected the
petition arguing that the proper way to deal with this matter is
to launch individual complaints when procedures are not carried
out.145 With this procedure, the HCJ will then be able to address
specific petitions about specific cases if a complaint has not been
properly examined. The HCJ further noted that it would be
improper for it to order the army to fulfill its own procedures,
and also rejected the request to order the army to determine and
publish procedures allowing for the regular supply of food and
medicine and the free movement of medical teams in the OPT,
based on the army’s claim that it was its policy to allow for such
provision and movement.146
This judgment, from the beginning of the Second Intifada,
highlights the non-intervention route chosen by the HCJ when
dealing with attempts at impact litigation seeking to challenge
policies restricting freedom of movement and, accordingly,
access to health care. The HCJ chose to see such arguments
generally, point to army procedures, and suggest individual
complaints. It thus dismissed the possibility of a broader
examination of the policy and the procedures by rejecting the
demand for a specific positive order on freedom of movement
regarding access to health care, a pattern that we will see
recurring. The problems persisted, however, and more cases date
back to that period. Some of them, dealing with specific villages
rather than with a generalized petition, point to a pattern: while
140. HCJ 9242/00 PHRI v. Minister of Defense (Mar. 21, 2001), ¶ 2, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
146. HCJ 9242/00 PHRI v. Minister of Defense (Mar. 21, 2001), ¶¶ 5–6, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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the case is pending, the army announces it will open up a route.
The petition is then rejected given factual changes that occur
during the litigation, and the HCJ again refuses to engage in a
broader review of the effects of movement restrictions. One such
case dealt with a specific village blocked by stone and earth
obstacles set up by the army.147 The village did not have a clinic,
forcing the residents to walk or ride a donkey for a few
kilometers in order to reach one.148 The petitioners demanded
that an access road be opened to their village and also, more
generally, that the army refrain from setting up physical (rather
than staffed) barriers in other cases as well.149 Addressing the
case, the HCJ noted that the state’s response mentioned that the
barrier set up on one route to the village had been removed and
the Court was satisfied that this had fulfilled part of the
petitioner’s demands.150 As for the broader demand to remove
barriers on roads in the area more generally and refrain from
setting up physical blocks, the HCJ again found this to be a
“general and unspecified” petition lacking a concrete basis that
would allow the court to examine it.151 Additionally, the Court
said it had taken note of the state’s declaration that, if
emergency passage was needed, the residents could approach
the army’s local coordination office and even the State
Attorney.152 As in its previous judgment, the HCJ did not
address the right to health under IHL or human rights law. In a
very brief decision, it showed satisfaction with the solution of the
concrete case (a solution reached under the shadow of the
litigation) but refused to leverage the case for a broader
statement. Given the extent of such restrictions at the time, the
HCJ’s refusal to look at the forest rather than at specific trees
precluded addressing the wider problem. The notion of calling
up the army or representatives of the State Attorney’s office in
emergency cases is hardly a solution precisely because
emergencies, by definition, do not leave time for such calls.
The pattern where a petition can lead to a local remedy or
solution was apparent in other cases as well. Those cases
stresses the effect of the restrictions on freedom of movement on
147. HCJ 32/01 Aladra v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Jan. 22, 2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
148. Id. ¶ 24.
149. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
150. Id. ¶ 1.
151. Id.
152. Id. ¶ 1.
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health care by pointing not only to the limits they place on
patients but also on the medical staff, equipment, and
ambulances. In the hearings of one of those cases, the state
announced it would keep an access road to the village open and
the petitioners agreed to withdraw their petition.153
The Sisyphean attempts to ease these restrictions continued
in another case, dealing with barriers set up by the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) around three villages near the city of
Nablus, which prevented access to the city.154 The army
informed the Court it had opened an alternative route
connecting the villages to a checkpoint to their south and from
that checkpoint to Nablus.155 This road, though unpaved, was
open to all vehicles.156 The army also noted two procedures it had
instituted instructing soldiers in checkpoints on the treatment
of residents seeking medical care and of residents reaching a
checkpoint during medical emergencies.157 The HCJ found these
answers satisfactory, citing security concerns, the fact that the
state had pointed to Nablus as a hotbed of terrorist activity, and
noting that the army’s measures were all intended to protect
Israelis against terrorism.158 It did concede that the villagers,
though mostly innocent, suffered from a difficult situation, but
could not find that the army’s actions failed tests of
reasonableness or proportionality.159
Addressing the argument that soldiers at checkpoints do not
comply with the orders on the passage of Palestinians seeking
medical care, the HCJ claimed this was a general argument it
153. HCJ 32/01 Aladra v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Jan. 22, 2001), ¶ 1, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 3637/01
Shakrana v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (Jan. 9, 2002),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). For a similar case, where the HCJ
found that the petition had been exhausted following the army’s announcement
that it had opened access roads to a village that had previously been physically
blocked, see HCJ 2811/01 Riachi v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Apr.16, 2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). A few days
after the ruling, Attorney Nimer Sultani from the Association for Civil Rights
in Israel sent letters to the State Attorney’s Office, indicating that the
commitments to the Court had yet to be fulfilled. Letter from Nimer Sultani,
Att’y Assoc. Civil Rights in Israel, to State Att’ys Off., (Apr. 1) (on file with
Author).
154. HCJ 2847/03 Alwana v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (July 14, 2003), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
155. Id. ¶ 3.
156. Id.
157. Id. ¶ 2.
158. Id. ¶ 4.
159. Id. ¶ 5.
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could not address, again avoiding any comprehensive judicial
pronouncement.160 Instead, the Court recommended that the
army should continually remind soldiers at checkpoints of the
need to act humanely.161
All the cases cited were litigated from 2001–2003. In none
of them did the HCJ offer an analysis of the right to health,
addressing the relevant provisions on it in IHL or in human
rights law. Given the scope of the problems resulting from the
restrictions on freedom of movement caused by the encirclement
and blocking of villages, the HCJ’s refusal to consider this
predicament from a broader perspective, either factually or
legally, hindered its role in this issue even if, arguably, the fate
of some villages was alleviated.
The issue of checkpoints was attacked through the judicial
system not only through administrative petitions to the HCJ,
but also in a tort claim brought by a West Bank resident who
was delayed at an army checkpoint.162 The claimant, who was
the mother of a nine-day-old boy, was with him en route to a
hospital in Nablus when they were delayed at a checkpoint.163
The baby died on arrival to the hospital.164 The Court noted the
claimant had stated that, although she believed the baby had
died because of the delay at the checkpoint, after consulting an
expert she had conceded that no causality link could be shown
between the delay and the death.165 Nevertheless, the Court held
for the claimant after it found that her claims of delay, brutal
behavior by the soldiers, and violence were credible.166 The
Court also awarded her damages, holding she had suffered
indirect damages because of her exposure to the suffering and
death of her son, and direct damages as she was exposed to
violence.167 This case points to the potential of tort litigation to

160. HCJ 2847/03 Alwana v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (July 14, 2003), ¶ 6, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
161. Id. A similar petition regarding “encirclements” of Bethlehem and Beth
Jalla that prevented leaving the towns westward was rejected citing security
needs, although the petitioners explained that the blocking had made the
hospital adjacent to the affected neighborhoods approachable only after a long
and winding detour. Id.
162. CC (Jer.) 19956/08 S.K.L.H.V. v. Ministry of Defense (July 5, 2015),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
163. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
164. Id. ¶ 2.
165. Id. ¶ 3.
166. Id. ¶ 54.
167. Id. ¶¶ 83–93.
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tackle restrictions on freedom of movement. Though the scope
was limited in this case because of the lack of proved causality,
it does suggest a channel that can potentially be used in other
cases as well. The tort tool, however, is always ex-post and
cannot ease restrictions in real time or undo medical harm or
death.
The barriers, encirclement, and checkpoints within the
West Bank that had been widespread during the Second Intifada
are far fewer now, so litigation about them has also declined.
With the recent resurgence of violence in the West Bank,
however, some cases have been reported of a siege on Palestinian
villages that affected access to health care, including delays and
disturbances to the circulation of ambulances.168
Restrictions on freedom of movement within the West Bank,
though reduced, have not disappeared entirely, and cases
relating to them still arise. In 2016, the HCJ dealt with a closure
imposed by the Israeli army on the city of Yatta, in the Hebron
District.169 This closure was part of various severe restrictions
affecting the city’s residents after two of them carried out a
terrorist attack in Tel Aviv. The petitioners argued that the
measures restricted access to two hospitals, two medical centers,
clinics, pharmacies, and laboratories that serve some 70,000
residents of the city and about 30,000 living in its vicinity.170 Not
only do these procedures prevent access to medical facilities in
the city but they also hinder the transfer of patients from local
to outside centers.171 The petitioners noted the violations of
prohibitions on collective punishment and various other rights,
including the right to freedom of movement, claiming that the
closure entails a severe breach of the rights to health and quick
access to health services, which are anchored in international
human rights law.172 As often in the past, however, only four
days after the filing of the petition, the army began removing the
barriers and the petitioners requested that the HCJ cancel the
urgent hearing scheduled for two days later, asking to submit a
revised notice.173 After the last barrier at the entrance to the city
168. See, e.g., Letter from PHRI, to Unite Licensing & Supervising
Ambulances (Feb. 28, 2016) (concerning delays affecting the entry of Red
Crescent ambulances to Jerusalem hospitals).
169. HCJ 5754/16 Mayor of Yatta v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the
West Bank (July 21, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (Isr.).
170. Id. ¶ 18.
171. Id.
172. Id. ¶¶ 22–36, 42–45, 49–52.
173. An urgent request on behalf of the petitioners to cancel the hearing
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was removed, both sides agreed to withdraw the petition.174
As the latter case illustrates, issues similar to those
described in this section may come up in the courts again. The
current military order on this matter determines that
Palestinian residents arriving at a checkpoint (including one
leading to Israel) for emergency medical treatment will be
allowed to cross even when lacking the permit that is usually
required. The commander of the checkpoint, to whom a soldier
must report such a case, has discretion on the matter.175 As in
the past, questions about implementation may resurface, but the
easing of restrictions on movement within the West Bank and
the removal of many internal checkpoints have led, as noted, to
less litigation on this issue reaching the Court in recent years.
Rather than disappearing, however, restrictions on freedom of
movement within the West Bank and their effect on health care
have mostly been translated into another form, to which I turn
next.
2. The Wall
In the early 2000s, Israel began building a wall in the West
Bank, which it describes as a “security fence.”176 Around this
time, cases involving the wall became the focus of the HCJ case
law dealing with the OPT in general, and with freedom of
movement and its effect on access to health care in particular.
The HCJ has addressed restrictions on access to health care as
part of the problems created by the wall in two related forms.177
The first involves the route of the wall, which separated people
from their health services, and the second concerns the effects of
the permits regime dealing with access to health care instituted
in the “seam zone.”178 The “seam zone” is the area between the
scheduled for July 27, 2016. See id.
174. Id.
175. Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT),
Treatment of Judea and Samaria Area Resident Reaching Checkpoint in
Emergency Medical Situation (Oct. 2014).
176. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 79 (July 9). See
also Aeyal Gross, The Construction of a Wall between the Hague and Jerusalem:
The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law and the Structure of
Occupation, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 393, 394 n.4 (2006).
177. See generally Gross, supra note 176, at 402–422 (discussing the two
Israeli High Court of Justice cases on the matter).
178. Id. at 389 n. 22, 412.
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wall and the Green Line; Palestinians residing in it became
subject to the permits’ regime with the wall’s construction.179
The construction of the wall as such has been addressed not
only by the Israeli HCJ but also by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ examined Israel’s actions and their effect
on the lives of Palestinians in the OPT in light of certain
provisions of GCIV, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.180 The
violation of these provisions purportedly infringes the freedom
of movement as well as the rights to work, health, education, and
an adequate standard of living, besides provisions concerning
the protection of property.181 Information that Palestinians
living between the wall and the Green Line would be cut off from
their land, workplaces, schools, health clinics, and other social
services, was pertinent to the ICJ’s determination on this
matter.182 The holding that Israel’s actions violated not only IHL
but also human rights treaties rested on the ICJ’s holding that
international human rights law applies in occupied territories
alongside IHL.183
Based on these violations, as well as on its determinations
that the wall is illegal since its route “gives expression in loco to
the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem
and the settlements,”184 and that its construction, together with
previous measures, “severely impedes the exercise by the
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is
therefore a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect this right,”185
the ICJ found that the building of the wall in the OPT is
illegal.186 By contrast, the Israeli HCJ has refrained from such a
statement, holding instead that the Israeli army was within its
authority when building the wall in the OPT given its power to
act for security purposes.187 The debate on cases on the wall in
179. Id. at 412.
180. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 137 (July 9).
181. Id. ¶ 123–37
182. Id. ¶ 133.
183. Id. ¶ 114.
184. Id. ¶ 122.
185. Id.
186. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 159 (July 9).
187. See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel 58(5) PD
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the Israeli HCJ, then, has focused mostly on whether
restrictions of Palestinian rights in specific segments or
particular measures adopted in the context of building the wall
have been proportional.
This Article will address only some of the many HCJ cases
concerning the wall, where access to health care arguments
played a central role.188 Generally, five stages can be identified
in the HCJ’s case law on the matter. (1) Before the General
Assembly requested the ICJ to issue the Advisory Opinion, the
HCJ had issued brief judgments holding it would not interfere
in the matter based on the principle of deferring to security
considerations.189 (2) Beit-Sourik, issued in 2005 several days
before the Advisory Opinion, was the HCJ’s first major judgment
on the topic.190 The HCJ held that building the wall in the OPT
was legal but that the segment examined in the decision was
illegal on grounds of proportionality.191 (3) Mara’abe, issued in
2006 after the Advisory Opinion and repeating the logic of Beit
Sourik, also held that protecting the settlements amounted to a
legitimate security consideration that could justify building the
wall.192 (4) Post-Mara’abe decisions where, except for cases
where the wall had clearly been built to protect settlement
expansion, the HCJ approved various segments (unlike in its
landmark decisions in Beit Sourik and Mara’abe), arguing that
the restrictions of movement were less severe than in those two
cases.193 Notably, in some of the cases discussed after Mara’abe,
the route of the wall was changed as part of an out-of-court
settlement between the parties.194 (5) The complex regime of
permits in force in the “seam zone,” which is used to regulate the
lives of Palestinians, was upheld by the HCJ as an integral part
807 (2004) (Isr.), translated in 38 ISR. L. REV. 83 (2005).
188. For a broader discussion, see GROSS, supra note 4, at 265–337. See also
Gross, supra note 176.
189. HCJ 8172/02 Ibrahim v. IDF Commander in the West Bank
(unpublished, 2002); HCJ 3771/02 Local Council of A-Ras Village v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria (unpublished, 2002); HCJ 3325/02 Rashin
Chasan (Kraos) v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria (unpublished,
2002), GROSS, supra note 4, at 430–431.
190. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel 58(5) PD 807 (2004)
(Isr.).
191. Id. ¶ 85.
192. See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (Sep. 15, 2005),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
193. See, e.g., HCJ 4387/06 Mas-ha Village Council v. Prime Minister (Apr.
11, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
194. See, e.g., id. ¶ 2.
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of the wall, arguing that its effects would be more adequately
dealt in localized petitions.195
To illustrate this trajectory, several cases specifically
concerned with access to health care will be cited in more detail.
In Mara’abe, one of the two “landmark cases,”196 the HCJ held
that the route of the wall in the area discussed had created a
“chokehold” over a number of Palestinian villages.197 Among the
wall’s detrimental effects on their lives, the petitioners
mentioned that they depended on health services from which the
wall had now separated them.198 The wall did have gates, but
they opened only at certain hours, making the villagers’ trip to
the nearby governmental hospital much longer.199 The HCJ cited
in its judgment an expert opinion that, inter alia, noted that the
wall had detached the villages in the area from health services,
that the medical care provided in the villages was now partial
and irregular, and that the access of emergency vehicles had
been badly affected.200 The petitioners argued that, in these
circumstances, the right to health had been disproportionately
violated.201 The HCJ accepted this argument, pointing out that
no hospitals or clinics existed in the villages affected by the wall
in that area and that the movement of doctors and ambulances
to the villages had been seriously disrupted, without any
solutions offered for emergencies.202
But Ma’arabe, as noted, was the exception to the rule. In
most subsequent cases, the HCJ refused to intervene, even if the
wall was occasionally rerouted during the litigation. In 2006, for
example, the HCJ rejected a petition concerning a wall segment
built near two Palestinian villages.203 The petitioner, a resident
from one of the villages, claimed that, because of delays, her twin
girls had been born at the checkpoint in her village and had
died.204 The army agreed to reroute the wall while the litigation
195. GROSS, supra note 4, at 265–337.
196. See Ronen Shamir, Landmark Cases and the Reproduction of
Legitimacy, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 781 (1990).
197. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. (Sep. 15, 2005), ¶ 113,
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
198. See id. ¶¶ 60–69.
199. Id. ¶¶ 54–58.
200. Id. ¶ 79.
201. Id. ¶ 81.
202. Id. ¶ 104.
203. HCJ 6336/04 Yousef Mousa v. Prime Minister of Isr. (Jan. 10, 2006),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
204. Id. ¶ 3.
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was pending but the petitioners argued that the new course still
detached the village from some of its lands.205 The HCJ,
however, refused to intervene and ruled that the new route was
within the army’s “zone of proportionality.”206 The litigation,
however, was still somewhat helpful to the petitioners, whom
the Court cited as agreeing that the wall’s negative effect on
their “web of life” had been significantly narrowed after the
rerouting.207
In other cases, petitions were rejected even without
adopting any changes. For example, a 2006 petition concerning
the wall’s route in another area of the West Bank claimed that
it prevented access from the villages to neighboring cities and
violated many of the residents’ rights, including the right to
health.208 The HCJ again declined to intervene and found that
the building of the wall in that area, beside the army’s
commitment to ensure the Palestinian residents’ access to the
main cities, was justified and met proportionality tests.209
Similar rulings were issued in other cases.210 The HCJ thus
intervened in a few exceptional instances, while agreements on
changes were reached in its shadow in a few others.211 Generally,
however, the HCJ upheld the building of the wall, thus
legitimizing the attending restrictions on freedom of
movement.212 Its discussion of the wall, then, was fragmented
into various petitions, each considering a specific segment,
unlike that of the ICJ, which had looked at the wall as a whole.213
By the time the HCJ came to deal with a petition submitted
against the wall in general, the arguments raised in it had
become irrelevant.214 The HCJ’s examination of each case
205. Id. ¶ 4–5.
206. Id. ¶ 9.
207. Id. ¶ 5.
208. HCJ 2942/05 Dr. Mansur v. Israel (Oct. 26, 2006), ¶ 12, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
209. Id. ¶ 34
210. See, e.g., HCJ 4387/06 Mas-ha Village Council v. Prime Minister (Apr.
11, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.)..
211. See Yoav Dotan, Pre-HCJ Procedures and Constitutional Dilemmas
about the Role of the State Attorney’s Office in the High Court of Justice, 7
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 159 (2004) (discussing the effect of the HCJ’s shadow on
OPT litigation generally).
212. See GROSS, supra note 4, at 325-337.
213. Id. at 306-307.
214. HCJ 9961/03 Hamoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual v.
Israel (Apr. 5, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
See also GROSS, supra note 4, at 269–70.
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separately did enable it to distinguish between more and less
severe cases but, without addressing the problem as a whole, the
issue became mostly one of proportionality.215 In this model of
analysis, freedom of movement generally, and for health needs
specifically, can be denied so long as it is “proportional” to
security needs. This model, however, fails to take into account
the bigger picture not only of the wall but also of the occupation
in general—security is allocated to one side only and, in its
name, rights are denied. The problem is not the wall per se but
a regime that allows restrictions on the civilians’ right to
freedom of movement, including for health purposes, which a
proportionality analysis can perhaps help to alleviate but cannot
resolve. The HCJ, which did not agree to look at the bigger
picture of the wall, certainly avoided looking at the even bigger
picture of the occupation regime as a whole.216
A rather exceptional instance of intervention is a case
involving a measure similar to the wall but not quite the wall.
The HCJ accepted a petition of Palestinian residents opposing
the building of a concrete railing alongside a road meant to
protect settlers who use it.217 The HCJ noted that the railing
would affect about five thousand residents from nearby villages,
restricting their access to basic services in neighboring urban
centers and violating their rights, including the right to
health.218 The HCJ held that the military commander could have
achieved the same security purposes by resorting to other
measures, and the restrictions on rights were therefore
disproportionate.219
Several cases involved the building of the wall in Jerusalem
and the immediate vicinity, where the wall’s route often removes
neighborhoods from the city and from work venues as well as
from vital education and health services.220 These decisions
215. For a detailed discussion, see Id. at 265–337.
216. For a discussion of the need to address the legality of the occupation
itself, see Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal
Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 551 (2005); GROSS, supra note 4, at 17–51.
217. See HCJ 1748/06 Mayor of ad-Dhahiriya v. Commander of the IDF
Forces in the West Bank (Dec. 14, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew) (Isr.).
218. Id. ¶ 17.
219. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
220. For discussions of the wall’s effect on Palestinians in Jerusalem, see
B’TSELEM, A WALL IN JERUSALEM: OBSTACLES TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE HOLY
CITY (2006), www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200607_a_wall_
in_jerusalem.pd; Merav Amir, On the Border of Indeterminacy: The Separation
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attest to the special problems resulting from the building of the
wall within Jerusalem, given that the partition splits not only
the OPT but also the purportedly united city. The separation of
East Jerusalem from the West Bank entails wider consequences
as well because some of the main Palestinian hospitals serving
the West Bank are in Jerusalem.221
Due to Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem after the 1967
war, the city’s Palestinian residents are considered residents of
Israel and can thus enter any part of Israel,222 but the wall now
separates even some of these citizens from the city. Health is
only one aspect of the West Bank’s detachment from what is the
major city in the region, as a result of Israeli policies.223 The HCJ
recognized in some cases that the wall cut off Palestinian
petitioners from territorial continuity with other parts of
Jerusalem, but found the arrangement proportional. For
example, petitioners argued in one case that the wall built
within Jerusalem leaves them on the West Bank but leaves most
of the services that they depend on in Jerusalem, violating their
rights to freedom of movement, to medical care, and many
others.224 The HCJ held in this case that the arrangement was
proportional, resting this determination mainly on the state’s
consent to allow passage continuously for pedestrians and
during the daytime for vehicles.225 In another case, the HCJ
recognized that a wall within the Jerusalem area would require
A-Ram neighborhood residents to pass through security checks
as they entered Jerusalem daily to work and to use public
services, as well as on their return.226 The petitioners pointed
out they would be detached from health services, including the

Wall in East Jerusalem, 16 GEOPOLITICS 768 (2011); Tovi Fenster & Oren
Shlomo, In the Shadow of the Wall and Separation: Everyday Life in East
Jerusalem, 17 PALESTINE-ISR. J. (2011).
221. See, ZIV, supra note 6, at 71–72.
222. See Law and Administration Order (no.1), 5727-1967, KT 2064 p. 2690.
See also Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH No. 980 p. 186.
See HCJ 282/88, Awad v. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior (June 5, 1988), ¶ 10, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
223. See, PHRI, A WALL IN ITS MIDST: THE SEPARATION BARRIER AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND ON PALESTINIAN HOSPITALS IN EAST
JERUSALEM (2005).
224. HCJ 1073/04 Salameh v. Head of IDF Center Command (Aug. 6, 2006),
¶ 3, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
225. Id.
226. HCJ 5488/04, Al-Ram Local Council v. Israel (Dec. 13, 2006), ¶ 25, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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hospitals they use in East Jerusalem.227 They argued that in the
neighborhoods north of Jerusalem to be detached by the wall,
including A-Ram, there is not even one hospital.228 Although the
Israeli Health Fund branches that they use as Israeli residents
will remain accessible to them, they do not provide the services
supplied by the Jerusalem hospitals from which they will now be
separated.229 The HCJ conceded that the obstacles in their
access to Jerusalem infringed the petitioners’ right to health.230
In its ruling, however, the HCJ found that the security
advantages of the wall’s planned route placed the balance struck
by the army within the “proportionality zone,” and noted the
importance of developing alternative medical services on the
side of the petitioners’ residence.231 It also mentioned that
Palestinians would be allowed to enter Jerusalem for medical
services based on permits issued by the Israeli Civil
Administration according to existing criteria,232 and that the
Israeli Ministry of Health would encourage the Health Funds to
act also “beyond the fence.”233
In other cases involving the building of the wall in the
Jerusalem area, Palestinian petitioners pointed to enclaves
created by the wall that they argued were similar to the one that
had been held to be disproportional in Mara’abe.234 The HCJ
rejected this argument pointing to the so-called “web of life
roads”—special roads that the army had determined that
Palestinians living in villages affected by the wall could use to
reach the municipal centers of Ramallah and Jerusalem.235 The
petitioners pointed out that access to their main municipal
center in Jerusalem through these roads would create a detour
and require crossing an Israeli checkpoint involving a 30-45

227. Id.
228. Id. ¶ 69.
229. See HCJ 6080/04, Masalmani v. Prime Minister (May 18, 2006), ¶¶ 68–
69, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)
230. HCJ 5488/04, Al-Ram Local Council v. Israel (Dec. 13, 2006), ¶ 49, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)
231. See id. ¶¶ 51–60.
232. Id. ¶ 8.
233. Id. ¶ 9 (noting that according to the HCJ’s analysis, Israeli law rather
than the international law of occupation applies to the wall segments built
within Jerusalem, but the HCJ held that, despite the differences, similar legal
principles guide both legal regimes); see also id. ¶ 46.
234. HCJ 4289/05 Local Authority Bir Nabala v. Israel (Nov. 26, 2005), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
235. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
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minute wait.236 Nonetheless, the HCJ held this route as
proportional even though the wall also separated villages from
their lands and required crossing gates in order to access
them.237
In some cases, appeal committees that dealt with land
confiscations for the purpose of building the wall in East
Jerusalem decided that some of the chosen locations
disproportionally violated rights, including the right to health
care.238 The effect of these cases on the overall picture, however,
seems limited.239
Finally, a judgment dealing with the permit regime
associated with the wall deserves mention. The HCJ ruled in
2011 on a general petition directly challenging the permits
regime instituted for the “seam zone.”240 This regime requires
Palestinians to hold residency cards (given for up to a renewable
two years) in order to live in their own homes, governs entry and
exit into the “seam zone” (even for residents), and issues short
or long term “personal” permits to enter the area for specific
needs to Palestinians who are not residents.241 The petitioners
argued that the permits regime was dispossessing the local
population and annexing land for political purposes,
discriminating against Palestinians, and restricting the rights of
the Palestinian population in disproportionate fashion,
including the right to health.242 The HCJ reiterated its holding
in Beit Sourik and Mara’abe, stating that the barrier was being
built for security purposes and that the permits regime in the
“seam zone” complemented the security purposes at the heart of
the barrier itself.243 Moving on to the violations of the
population’s rights and without specifically addressing health
beyond the citing to the petitioners’ arguments, the HCJ held
236. Id. ¶ 42.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Appeals Committee (Tlv.) 556/04 Abed al-Fattah v. General
Director of the Ministry of Defense (July 16, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
239. See sources cited supra note 220.
240. HCJ 9961/03 Hamoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual v.
Israel (Apr. 5, 2011), ¶ 10, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
241. For a description of this regime, see HAMOKED, THE PERMIT REGIME:
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE WEST BANK AREAS KNOWN AS THE “SEAM
ZONE” (2013); SHAUL ARIELI & MICHAEL SFARD, HOMAH U-MEHDAL [THE WALL
OF FOLLY] 172–195 (2008).
242. HCJ 9961/03 Hamoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual v.
Israel (Apr. 5, 2011), ¶ 10.
243. Id. ¶¶ 12–17.
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that the picture portrayed by the petitioners was indeed harsh
insofar as people’s access to their lands was concerned.244 The
military commander, however, had nonetheless exercised his
authority legally, with his actions passing the proportionality
test used in the previous case law.245 While the HCJ pointed to
several changes it considered necessary in order to ease life for
those in the “seam zone” or wishing to enter it,246 it upheld the
regime and rejected the petition. In addressing the gap between
the “harsh picture” that had been presented to it and its rejection
of the petition, the HCJ noted that the petition’s “generality” had
been detrimental to its cause.247 Its failure to address the fate of
specific areas along the route of the “seam zone” had hindered
assessment of the situation in detail, as the HCJ had done in
dozens of previous petitions dealing with specific segments of the
barrier.248
Once more, then, the HCJ opted for the “separation” route,
basing its rejection of the petition on the petitioners’ attempt to
present the big picture and encouraging a type of litigation that
sees the trees but not the forest. This approach, as this section
has shown, allows for an analysis that ultimately legitimizes the
separation barrier and the regime associated with it. The HCJ
had endorsed a similar approach in the litigation dealing with
the checkpoints: a refusal to deal with a generalized and
principled petition, which may help to alleviate specific local
problems but appears to legitimize the regime as a whole. The
effects on access to health care continue to be felt. To cite only
one example, consider the case of twenty-one-year-old Adel
Omar, a resident of Azun, a Palestinian village locked in the
seam zone where the route of the wall had been planned so as to
protect a few settlements.249 Omar was injured in an accident,
but the wall separated him from the nearest hospital in
Qalqiliyah and the gate was closed at night. Omar’s friends had
to argue with the soldiers for over an hour to persuade them to
open the gate and let him through, by the time they reached the
244. Id. ¶ 3.
245. Id. ¶ 42.
246. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 47.
247. HCJ 9961/03 Hamoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual v.
Israel (Apr. 5, 2011), ¶ 34, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
248. Id.
249. Gideon Levy, Express Shel Hatzot [Midnight Express], HAARETZ (Feb.
27, 2007), http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1390703. Following the publication of
this article, the army agreed to keep this specific gate open 2twenty-four hours
a day. Id.
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hospital, Omar was dead.250 This is only one revealing instance
of the wall’s harmful effects on access to health care.251
3. Exit Permits
Unlike the two previous categories of cases pertaining to
movement within the West Bank (and Gaza), the cases discussed
in this section deal mostly with Palestinians who need to exit the
OPT for medical treatment. A number of scenarios are possible—
a need to exit the OPT for treatment in Israel (including, from
Israel’s perspective, in East Jerusalem) or in another country; a
need to exit Gaza (especially after the 2005 “disengagement”) for
medical treatment in the West Bank, in Israel, or in another
country. The need for exit permits is most common among
residents of the West Bank and Gaza who are referred for
treatment in East Jerusalem, home to three of the six most
advanced Palestinian hospitals.252 In many other cases, patients
from Gaza are referred for treatment in the West Bank and
require a permit to go through Israel.253 Tens of thousands of
Palestinians are also referred to facilities outside the OPT if
means for appropriate treatment are unavailable within it,
requiring them to travel to Jordan, Egypt, or Israel.254
Current policies and procedures will be described below in
detail but, usually, obtaining a permit means submitting an
application (including medical documents) to the Israeli
coordination and liaison authorities, which decide whether to
approve it.255 Other cases deal with the movement of medical
teams and medical students rather than of patients. Cases are
250. Id.
251. For detailed discussion of these effects see U.N. OFF. OF COORDINATION
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS & WHO, THE IMPACT OF THE BARRIER ON HEALTH,
SPECIAL FOCUS (2010), http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/
documents/pdf/ocha_opt_special_focus_july_2010_english_2.pdf?ua=1; see also
MEDICAL AID FOR PALESTINIANS (MAP), TEN YEARS SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE RULING: THE IMPACT OF THE SEPARATION WALL ON THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH (2014), https://www.map-uk.org/downloads/reports/theimpact-of-the-separation-wall-on-the-right-to-health-----map.pdf.
252. PHRI, #DENIED – HARASSMENT OF PALESTINIAN PATIENTS APPLYING
FOR EXIT PERMITS, 9 (2015).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 22. See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, RIGHT TO HEALTH:
CROSSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS HEALTH IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY 2014-2015,
http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/
documents/WHO_-_Access_Report_2014-15_-Final.pdf?ua=1.
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thus divided into three categories: exit from the West Bank (and
pre-disengagement Gaza), exit from (post-disengagement) Gaza,
and exit of medical teams and students.
a. Exit from the West Bank (and Pre-Disengagement Gaza)
In an early case, PHRI petitioned against the lack of clarity
in the army’s criteria and procedures concerning patients’
requests for permits to exit the OPT.256 The state answered that,
following the petition, a new procedure had been instituted on
the matter and the petition was erased by agreement.257 But just
as the matter of checkpoints and the procedures surrounding
them (addressed in the same petition) reached the HCJ again,
as noted, the matter of patients’ exit permits also returned to the
Court. Less than a decade after the first round, PHRI petitioned
the HCJ again and argued that the procedures adopted by the
army in 2001 following its petition had not been fulfilled.258 The
new petition pointed to a number of faults, of which the main
two were the state’s failure to meet the requirement of
submitting a medical opinion every time it denied an exit permit
for medical reasons, and the failure to abide by the timetable
prescribed in the procedure for regular and urgent exit permit
requests.259 The state argued it had followed the procedure but
would improve some of its elements, as follows: it would justify
its denials of requests,260 it would computerize the system to
allow the tracking of requests,261 and it would regularly provide
information on the possibility of appealing a denied request.262
The state also explained it was not required to provide a medical
opinion when the refusal was based on security rather than on
medical grounds, which was indeed the basis for most
refusals.263 The state also added it was aware of the need for a
swift answer, even if one was not always possible,264 and noted

256. See HCJ 9109/96 PHRI v. Minister of Defense (Dec. 12, 1996).
257. Id.
258. HCJ 7094/05 PHRI v. COGAT (Apr. 27, 2010), ¶¶ 6–9, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
259. Id. ¶¶ 6–9.
260. Id. ¶ 22.
261. Id. ¶ 35.
262. Id. ¶14.
263. Id. ¶ 17.
264. HCJ 7094/05 PHRI v. COGAT (Apr. 27, 2010), ¶ 18, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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it would consult a physician when refusing a request.265 Answers
would be sent within a week unless the request was rejected on
security grounds, and no later than three days before the
requested exit date.266 Security considerations, however, could
delay the process.267
After a long delay in dealing with the case pending before it,
the HCJ summarized the issues by emphasizing the
humanitarian importance of medical treatment for those in need
of it—be they residents and citizens of Israel, of another country,
or even enemy nationals—while also stressing the wide margin
of discretion the state enjoyed in this regard.268 It held that,
while the petition was being heard, many of the matters pointed
out by the petitioners had been answered satisfactorily.269 The
state, the HCJ held, is attentive to the need for processing exit
permits more efficiently.270 Timetables, however, remained a
controversial topic. The HCJ found that the army standard
requiring requests to be in no more than fourteen working days
before the exit and replies to be given no more than five days
before the date of the requested exit was reasonable, and
rejected the petition.271 In another case, a refusal on security
grounds that the HCJ found persuasive, the petitioner withdrew
his petition. This case dealt with a request to allow a cancer
patient, a 36-year-old Palestinian from Al Habala village in the
Qalqiliya area, to enter Israel for a bone marrow test at
Hadassah Hospital.272 The patient’s last request was denied for
security reasons and a request sent to the Military Legal Advisor
265. Id. ¶ 17.
266. Id. ¶ 22.
267. Id. ¶¶ 22-29.
268. Id. ¶¶ 30–33.
269. Id. ¶ 35.
270. HCJ 7094/05 PHRI v. COGAT (Apr. 27, 2010), ¶ 35, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
271. Id. ¶¶ 34–40. Another petition concerning problems in the
implementation of this procedure was erased by agreement in HCJ 5732/06
PHRI v. COGAT, Judgment (July 27, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.); in HCJ 5732/06 PHRI v. COGAT, Petition (July 27, 2006),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). For cases where, following a
petition, the army allowed entry to Israel for treatment and said it would
examine further requests of the same patient on its merits pending no security
preventing circumstances, see the Respondent’s and the Petitioner’s answers in
HCJ 10642/03 Barghouthi v. IDF Commander in Gaza, which led to the deletion
of the petition, and ¶¶ 10–22 to the following petition (HCJ 10642/04
Barghouthi v. IDF Commander in Gaza).
272. HCJ 2058/04 Charov v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Mar. 4, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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was not answered.273 The state argued that, according to recent
intelligence information, the petitioner was not allowed to enter
Israel but could go to Jordan if he wished.274 When the HCJ
decided that the security materials presented ex parte showed
that the petitioner could pose a risk if he entered Israel, his
lawyer agreed to withdraw the petition.275
Another case dealt with a resident of the West Bank who
asked for an exit permit to accompany his wife, a resident of
Jaffa in Israel, for his son’s birth.276 The authorities had
forbidden him entry “on criminal grounds,” claiming he had
previously stayed in Israel without authorization.277 He could
not stay in Israel with his wife since an Israeli law prevents
Palestinians from the OPT obtaining residency in Israel even if
married to an Israeli citizen.278 The baby was born without his
presence. After the petition to the Court, the army agreed to
allow him entry and, eventually, to change the procedures too so
as to allow fathers to accompany their partners during the birth
of their children.279 This arrangement, which took on the status
of a judicial verdict, stated that the procedure for approving
Palestinians’ requests for permits to obtain medical treatment
and accompany patients would be amended to state “including a
woman giving birth.”280
The current military order determines that West Bank
residents should be allowed, barring security grounds, to obtain
medical treatment in the OPT, in Israel, or abroad.281 The order
covers movement from the OPT to Israel and abroad at “routine”
times as well, as during full closure of the OPT, internal closure,
or “encirclement” of a certain area.282 (This procedure is separate
from the one discussed above, which dealt with emergency cases
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Administrative Appeal (Jer.) 41011-11-14 John Doe (Mar. 16, 2015),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). For a discussion, see PHRI, supra
note 252, at18.
277. Administrative Appeal (Jer.) 41011-11-14 John Doe (Mar. 16, 2015),
¶ 12.
278. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision), 57632003, (Isr.).
279. See PHRI, supra note 252, at 18.
280. Administrative Appeal (Jer.) 41011-11-14 John Doe v. (Mar. 16, 2015).
281. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES
(COGAT), HANDLING REQUESTS OF RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORIES SEEKING
MEDICAL TREATMENT (2014).
282. Id. ¶ 1(d).
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of Palestinians reaching checkpoints within the West Bank). It
specifically states that it is based on the state’s commitment to
the HCJ, highlighting the central role that litigation played in
this matter.283 Moreover, it may also indicate that in this context
(unlike that of the checkpoints and the wall), the HCJ agreed to
hear and decide on a generalized petition, allowing for actual
policy change through impact litigation rather than merely
alleviating some individual or local circumstances.284 The order
contains forms that West Bank residents seeking exit permits to
Israel for medical treatment must fill out and the modes of
submitting them.285 It also notes that no permit is needed to exit
abroad for medical treatment via Jordan except for cases
involving security reasons, though residents can still apply
under this procedure even if such reasons exist.286 Requests
must include updated medical records and an invitation by the
medical institute in Israel or abroad, and also in the West Bank
if the request entails movement within the West Bank at times
of internal restrictions.287 The order notes that requests would
be processed as quickly as possible given the importance of
medical treatment.288 Generally, then, during “routine” times,
requests will not be denied if a medical problem is indeed present
and an invitation by a medical institution in Israel is included,
all so long as the person is not prevented (on security grounds)
from entering Israel. For “exceptional reasons,” the request may
be approved even if one of the conditions is not fulfilled.289
Additionally, reasons must be given for all denials.290 The order
also states that when the Israeli army imposes a general closure
on certain areas or when the request pertains to someone who is
denied entry into Israel for security reasons, the permit will still
be approved if it is urgent and/or if it concerns a lifesaving
treatment unavailable in the West Bank, such as radiation,
transplants, cardiac catheterization, and dialysis for children.291
Such requests will be refused on security grounds only after
considering all the alternatives, and refusals must be

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 3(b).
Id. ¶ 3(c).
Id. ¶ 3(d)(4).
Id. ¶ 3(e)(2).
Id.
Id. ¶ 3(f)(1).
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justified.292 At times of internal closure within the West Bank, a
person scheduled for medical treatment within the West Bank
will generally be allowed to exit.293 The rules in force are similar
to those stated above.
Further rules deal with exceptional requests concerning
traveling abroad through the Israeli airport to Palestinians who
are refused entry to Israel, which will usually not be approved
unless pertaining to an emergency treatment unavailable in the
area.294 Additionally, the “permits status” document issued by
the army in 2016 lists three purposes of entry for medical
reasons: medical reasons for cancer and dialysis patients,
patients with chronic diseases, and invitations from hospitals;
accompanying a hospitalized or chronically ill family member,
and visiting a sick family member.295
An additional IDF procedure, published in October 2017,
determines a twenty-three-day period (not including holidays
and weekends) for processing health-related permits for Gaza
residents,296 while also stating that permits will be processed
immediately in urgent cases (“life-saving” situations).297
These rules, and especially the procedures for submitting
exit permits requests, reveal a bureaucratic structure that,
barring security considerations, holds that exit for medical
treatment should generally be allowed. This structure does show
the effects of litigation while also pointing to the limits of the
humanitarian arrangement where the Palestinians’ basic right
to freedom of movement for any purpose, in this case for health,
depends on the occupier’s willingness to establish a
bureaucratic-humanitarian regime. This is obviously better
than a policy that generally forbids exit, but also points to the
basic problem of movement restrictions and dependence on a
292. Id. ¶ 3(f)(2).
293. Id. ¶ 3(g)(1).
294. Id. ¶ 3(h).
295. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES
(COGAT), STATUS OF UNCLASSIFIED PERMITS FOR PALESTINIAN ENTRY INTO
ISRAEL FOR THEIR PASSAGE BETWEEN JUDEA AND SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP
AND FOR THEIR DEPARTURE ABROAD (2016).
296. This also includes accompanying patients and traveling abroad for
medical treatment. The procedure also dictates a fifty-day period for processing
permits to visit a sick family member (in the West Bank and in Israel), and a
seventy day period for permits to participate in medical training courses outside
the Gaza Strip. See COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE
TERRITORIES (COGAT), HANDLING REQUESTS FOR PERMITS FOR PALESTINIANS
LIVING IN THE GAZA STRIP (2017).
297. Id.
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permit for what should be a basic human right.
b. Exit from Post-Disengagement Gaza
In the generalized case dealing with exit permits discussed
in the previous section, the distinction became apparent between
the West Bank and Gaza. The petition was submitted in 2005
but the judgment was issued in 2010, and the disengagement
occurred while it was pending.298 The HCJ cited the state’s
response clarifying that, even before 2005, the procedure that
applied regarding Gaza residents was different from the one in
the West Bank.299 Regarding the West Bank, the inclination was
to approve requests for medical treatment in Israel in the
absence of security reasons.300 Regarding Gaza, however, deeper
probes were conducted and, because of the higher security risks,
options for alternative treatment were examined.301 The HCJ
held that, after the disengagement, the Israeli military
commander is no longer present in Gaza and requests must be
addressed to the Israeli Ministry of Interior.302 However, the
procedure stipulated in the order de facto applies to Gazans too,
even if they have no right to enter Israel.303 But, the army noted
that circumstances in Gaza after the rise of the Hamas
government preclude implementation of a rigid timetable for
answering exit permits requests.304 In another decision
pertaining to Gaza residents that wanted to enter Israel for
medical treatment, the HCJ held that, after the end of the
military administration, authority to allow Gazans to enter
Israel rests with the Israeli Minister of Interior.305 This points
to the perception of post-disengagement Gaza as a foreign entity
rather than as occupied territory, a perception supposedly
imposing fewer duties on Israel.306

298. Id. ¶ 11.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. ¶ 20.
303. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
304. Id. ¶ 20.
305. HCJ 4487/08 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza
63(1) PD 149 (2008) (Isr.).
306. Id. ¶ 6.

466

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2

The effects of this view of Gaza as a territory beyond Israel’s
responsibility is apparent in cases involving the movement of
Gaza residents, especially when they wish to enter Israel.
Although entry from the OPT into Israel has been limited, in
different forms, since the early 1990s, the disengagement
allowed the HCJ to deal with them as requests by residents of
an enemy state rather than as individuals to whom Israel, as an
occupying power, owes a special duty. For example, in a case
involving a Gaza resident seeking to enter Israel for essential
chemotherapy, the HCJ accepted the state’s denial of the request
because he was claimed to pose a security threat.307 The HCJ
approached the request as if the petitioner were from a foreign
country and, indeed, an enemy country, to be handled by Israel
strictly on a voluntary humanitarian basis.308 This patient was
nevertheless allowed to enter Israel for medical treatment
contingent on a security guard being attached to him—at his
expense.309 The petitioner argued that he required the special
expertise available at Israeli hospitals but the HCJ held that,
although providing lifesaving medical treatment is a meaningful
humanitarian value, it does not override other important
interests, especially the protection of public security.310 Allowing
a “foreign resident” to enter Israel for medical treatment is a
matter within the discretion of the Israeli government, and each
case should be examined individually while taking all
considerations into account. The state should balance the need
to grant humanitarian assistance on the one hand against the
assessment of security risks on the other, whenever information
on such risks is available.311 The court also noted that the
petitioner could exit Gaza to Egypt or Jordan for medical
treatment there or exit from Egypt or Jordan to a third
country.312

307. HCJ 1912/08 PHRI v. IDF Commander in Gaza (Apr. 16, 2008), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
308. Id. ¶ 7.
309. See generally, HCJ 7730/06 PHRI v. IDF Commander in Gaza (Sep. 27,
2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (dealing with expenses
relating to security guards demanded by Israel); HCJ 4920/06 PHRI v. The
Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (June 25, 2006), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (dealing with expenses relating to security
guards demanded by Israel).
310. HCJ 1912/08 PHRI v. IDF Commander in Gaza (Apr. 16, 2008), ¶ 7,
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
311. Id.
312. Id.
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Another case dealt with eleven Gaza residents who had not
been allowed to exit Gaza to enter Israel for medical
treatment.313 During the hearings, the state announced that
some would be allowed to exit through Egypt instead.314 The
petitioners again argued for a duty of the state and the state
argued it had no duties in this regard.315 The HCJ said it would
not enter the legal question of Gaza’s status since it was doubtful
that this consideration could be helpful regarding humanitarian
issues, and suggested that the state reconsider its decision so as
to allow medical treatment while minimizing security risks.316
The HCJ kept the case open until the state eventually reported
that six petitioners had entered Israel; one is in a Hamas prison,
one was hospitalized in Gaza, one was awaiting a visa to Egypt,
one had died, and one had entered Egypt.317 The HCJ then held
that the case had been exhausted.318
In another case, and based on information provided by the
army, the HCJ accepted that there was a linkage between the
petitioners seeking medical treatment and terrorist groups.319
The HCJ therefore “recommended” that the state transfer the
petitioners to medical centers in Jordan in a security escorted
ambulance, given that passage to Egypt was closed from the
Egyptian side at the time.320
The Israeli authorities specifically noted in other hearings
as well that Palestinians have no right to enter Israel and Israel
holds no legal responsibility for events in Gaza.321 Nevertheless,
Israel does coordinate with the Palestinian authorities the
allocation of permits to enter or pass through Israel for medical
purposes in cases involving life-saving situations, and a
significant number of such permits have been granted.322 The
HCJ also noted that distinguishing between life-saving and
313. HCJ 9522/07 PHRI v. IDF Southern Command (Decision from Nov. 28,
2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
314. Id. ¶ b.
315. Id. ¶ c(3).
316. Id. ¶ d.
317. HCJ 9522/07 PHRI v. IDF Southern Command (Judgment from Feb.
12, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
318. Id.
319. HCJ 5786/07 PHRI v. IDF Commander in The Gaza Strip (July 2,
2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
320. Id.
321. HCJ 5429/07 PHRI v. Minister of Defense, (June 20, 2007), ¶ b, Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
322. GROSS, supra note 4, at 230.
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quality of life treatments (which may include saving a patient’s
eyesight or a limb) may at times be hard, and cases must be
examined individually.323 The HCJ again held here that, given
the urgency of the request, it would not enter into questions
touching on the status of Gaza and of Israel’s legal duties or lack
thereof, even if they had come up in the parties’ submissions.324
Instead, the HCJ, said it would limit itself to the “operative
common denominator, that is, to the humanitarian aspects by
virtue of which the state too is ready to treat patients who
require urgent life-saving medical treatment.”325 This case is one
of many where the HCJ avoided any determination on duties
and took the supposedly pragmatic course which resulted in
helping some but came too late for at least one. Another one of
these cases dealt with Gaza residents who wanted to enter
Israel, some for medical treatment and others for passage to
Jordan and Egypt.326 While some petitioners were allowed entry
while the petition was pending, others were denied permits on
security grounds.327 After examining secret documents
presented by the state and given the army’s insistence on
security risks, the HCJ decided to abstain from intervention,
even though some of the petitioners were clearly in need of
urgent medical treatment.328 Israel said it would allow their exit
to Egypt when passage from Gaza to Egypt (closed at the time)
reopened or, failing that, would consider allowing exit to
Jordan.329
Another refusal occurred in a 2016 decision concerning a
petitioner who suffered from a heart problem. He asked to enter
the West Bank through Israel or to enter Israel to have an
isotopic heart scan at an Israeli hospital.330 A medical opinion
handed to the court on the petitioner’s behalf determined that
failure to perform the scan would put the petitioner at
unnecessary risk.331 The respondents argued that the petitioner
323. HCJ 5429/07 PHRI v. Minister of Defense, (June 20, 2007), ¶ f(5)(b),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
324. Id. ¶ b.
325. Id.
326. HCJ 11105/07 PHRI v. IDF Commander in Gaza (Jan. 8, 2008), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
327. Id. ¶¶ 2–6.
328. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
329. Id.
330. HCJ 3225/16 Muhamad Maslem v. IDF Southern Command (July 14,
2016), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
331. Id. ¶ 1.
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had participated in terrorist activities in the past and was in
contact with terrorist operatives, and refused him the permit.332
The HCJ rejected the petition and held that the “balance” struck
by the respondent had not been unreasonable.333 Failure to
perform the examination would not put the petitioner in mortal
danger, and catheterization, for which the patient had been
referred originally, was available in Gaza.334 Deputy Chief
Justice Rubinstein suggested in a dissenting opinion that, since
this is a medical subject involving potential risks, a cardiologist
attesting for the respondents should issue an opinion on the
abstention from the examination.335 The majority justices,
however, held that the medical opinion submitted by the
petitioner, which had not been disputed by the army, made this
action superfluous.336 This case again reflects the trumping
nature of security arguments.337
One rare instance of PHRI successfully overturning alleged
security considerations dealt with a Gaza resident suffering
from colorectal cancer.338 The PA referred her for treatment at
Makassed Hospital and later at Hadassah Hospital in Israel.339
The frequent treatments began at the end of June 2016.340 In
October 2016, the state refused to allow the patient to attend
additional treatments at Hadassah claiming security reasons.341
PHRI then filed a petition on behalf of the patient at the Beer
Sheva Administrative Court.342 The Court was asked to allow
the petitioner to enter Hadassah or Makassed hospitals for
urgent medical treatments that are not available in Gaza.343 The
petition claimed that, without those treatments, her situation
could deteriorate and that waiting for treatment would involve
unnecessary suffering.344 The petition was finally erased on the
332. Id. ¶ 1.
333. Id. ¶ 3.
334. Id. ¶ 3.
335. Id. ¶ 3.
336. HCJ 3225/16 Muhamad Maslem v. IDF Southern Command (July 14,
2016), ¶ 4, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
337. Id.
338. See Marfat Hassuna v. IDF Southern Command, 47821-11-16 (Beer
Sheva) (Nov. 27, 2016) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
339. Id. ¶ 2.
340. Id. ¶ 5.
341. Id. ¶ 6.
342. Id.
343. Id. ¶ 70.
344. Marfat Hassuna v. IDF Southern Command, 47821-11-16 (Beer Sheva)
(Nov. 27, 2016), ¶ 7, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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morning of the hearing due to the state’s consent to allow the
petitioner’s entry.345 The state was also required to pay the
petitioner’s damages.346
Current Israeli military orders on exit from Gaza to Israel
thus determine that, barring security grounds, requests will be
approved in medical cases. The procedure also includes a
mechanism for reconsideration upon request.347 The “permits
status” document issued in 2016 lists the medical-related
reasons that residents of Gaza can adduce in requests to enter
Israel: (1) the need for life-saving treatment (or one without
which the nature of life “totally changes”) that is unavailable in
Gaza, to be provided in Israel, the West Bank, or abroad, (2)
professional training and specialization in hospitals in Israel or
the West Bank that can strengthen medical services given to
Gaza residents in cases of risk to life or ones without which the
nature of life “totally changes,” (3) visiting a first-degree family
member who is seriously ill with a disease that is life-risking or
requires long hospitalization (in Israel, the West Bank, or
abroad), (4) specialized organized tours for sick children and
children with special needs.348 The same document also allows
West Bank residents to enter Gaza for exceptional humanitarian
reasons—visiting a first-degree family member seriously ill with
a disease that may be life-threatening or requires long
hospitalization.349 Health issues, then, are subject to the same
apparatus of bureaucratic occupation that Palestinians are
subjected to generally—one that judicial review may have
helped to create.
Testimonies from June 2017 indicate that the PA had been
blocking the exit of patients from Gaza for medical treatment for
two months, as part of the power struggle between the PA and
Hamas.350 In July 2017, the Gazan Ministry of Health reported
that a three-year-old girl was the sixteenth victim of “Ramallah’s
delays in providing approval and financial commitments for

345. See id.
346. Id.
347. THE COORDINATION AND LIAISON ADMINISTRATION TO THE GAZA STRIP
(GAZA CLA), ISSUING PERMITS FOR GAZA RESIDENTS FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
(2014).
348. COGAT, supra note 295.
349. Id.
350. Jack Khoury, Palestinian Authority Prevents Gazans From Leaving
Strip for Urgent Medical Treatment in Israel, HAARETZ (June 26, 2017),
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-1.797810.
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treatment in Israeli hospitals.”351 The PA and the Ministry of
Health in Ramallah denied claims of a change in policy, and
blamed both Hamas and Israel for the situation.352
c. Summing Up: Exit Permits for Patients—Rights or
Bureaucracy?
The bureaucratic mechanism described above creates
various procedural problems, including difficulty accessing
coordination and liaison authorities.353 A 2004 report described
the complex bureaucracy involved in obtaining various kinds of
permits for Palestinians who need to travel.354 The report
mentioned disruptions in communication, arbitrariness, and
lack of transparency, stressing the bureaucratic violence
apparent in the waiting for a permit that may or may not come,
the lack of information about the process, and the creation of a
mechanism for controlling individuals asking for a permit
without any discussion of rights.355 One example of a
bureaucratic restriction, though no longer in force, affected
displaced Palestinians who lived in Gaza but were not registered
in the Israeli-controlled population registry and, in the past, had
been prevented from applying for exit permits to Israel.356 At
least in one case, this restriction led to the death of a cancer
patient who could not obtain a permit despite repeated advocacy
on her behalf.357 Although the army agreed in 2014 to cancel this
restriction, the change came too late for her.358
Requiring permits for exit allows Israel to exercise great
control over Palestinians. A PHRI report issued in 2015 points
to technical and substantial failures in the conduct of the Israeli
coordination and liaison authorities.359 Palestinian patients and
351. Jack Khoury, Gaza Health Ministry: Toddler Died Because PA Delayed
Medical Treatment in Israel, HAARETZ (July 14, 2017), http://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/1.801250.
352. Id.
353. HCJ 2847/03 Alwana v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (July 14, 2003), ¶ 26–28, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
354. PHRI, THE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE GAZA STRIP: PATIENTS PAY THE
PRICE (2005), www.phr.org.il/uploaded/26.9.05Report.pdf.
355. PHRI & MACHSOM WATCH, THE BUREAUCRACY OF OCCUPATION: THE
DISTRICT CIVIL LIAISONS OFFICE 50 (2004).
356. PHRI, supra note 354.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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their companions must submit to security interrogations as a
prerequisite for an exit permit for medical treatment.360 This
practice was actually reviewed by the HCJ in a case where
petitioners argued that the questioning, beyond relevant
medical information, also seeks information about others and
demands that permit seekers become collaborators.361 The HCJ
rejected this argument, relying on the security services’
declaration that they do not use a person’s illness for the purpose
of attaining security information.362 In 2015, however, for the
very first time, an official Israeli representative made a
statement supporting this claim.363
Security is clearly the overarching factor. A person who
would otherwise meet the criteria can be denied a permit
because she or he is considered to be a security risk. The basis
for this category is hardly ever exposed to the patient (and, at
best, is only given to the Court ex parte). This illustrates the onesided nature of “security”—the Palestinians’ security is not part
of the security consideration, even though Palestinians may
have humanitarian considerations on their side.364
A 2015 PHRI report also points to delays in checkpoints and
to the rejection of exit permits applications that may lead to
deterioration of the person’s condition and to premature
death.365 In 2014, PHRI recorded two cases of patients who died
after being denied passage for medical treatment.366 During
2015, PHRI documented yet another case of a cancer patient
residing in Gaza, who died after being denied passage to be
treated at Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv.367 According to the 2015

360. See PHRI, HOLDING HEALTH TO RANSOM: GSS INTERROGATION AND
EXTORTION OF PALESTINIAN PATIENTS AT EREZ CROSSING (2008).
361. HCJ 9522/07 PHRI v. IDF Southern Command, Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription) (Isr.).
362. Id.
363. An Israeli TV channel published a conversation between the family of
Abera Mengistu (an Israeli citizen held in the Gaza Strip) and Lior Lotan, the
Prime Minister’s representative for prisoners and missing persons. During that
conversation, Lotan said: “When people, relatives of Hamas’ big boys, senior
people . . . . When they wanted to enter Israel for medical treatment in Israel,
we told them: “No, bring us information on Abera.” PHRI, HARASSMENT OF
PALESTINIAN PATIENTS APPLYING FOR EXIT PERMITS 19 (2015).
364. On the “(Im)balance of Security” see GROSS, supra note 4, at 136–337.
On the category of people whose entry is prevented based on “security” reasons,
see BERDA, THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION, supra note 76, at 133–63.
365. PHRI, supra note 255, at 23–25.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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and 2016 reports, about twenty percent of the applications for
exit permits were rejected.368 Almost half of these rejections
were eventually overturned following PHRI’s intervention,
meaning that even the Israeli authorities ultimately decided
they had been unfounded.369 In some of the other cases, referrals
were diverted to Egyptian hospitals370—not an easy solution
given the frequent closure of the Rafah crossing between Gaza
and Egypt.
The report also discloses that, out of almost 300 cases that
PHRI considered in 2014, about two-thirds were from Gaza and
less than a third from the West Bank.371 The gap was even bigger
in 2016: 223 requests were received from the Gaza Strip
compared to 20 from the West Bank.372 Also worth noting is the
increase in the number of requests PHRI received in 2015 from
cancer and heart patients (68) whose applications for exit
permits for medical treatment were denied or delayed.373 This
figure represents an increase of more than one hundred percent
over 2014 and may reflect a tougher policy on the transit of
patients from Gaza,374 with the percentage of approvals of exit
requests from Gaza dropping by thirteen percent.375 PHRI also
pointed to a tougher policy concerning the transit of patients
whose medical condition (even if not life-threatening) requires
treatment unavailable where they live, and the passage of
escorts accompanying patients.376 These changes underscore
that access to health care for Palestinians is a function of a
changing Israeli policy rather than a recognized human right, as
indicated by the decreasing number of approved requests, with
delays and refusals reportedly leading to twenty deaths of

368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. For a detailed discussion of the referrals and permits system and of
cases denied, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 255. See also
WHO, RIGHT TO HEALTH: CROSSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS HEALTH IN THE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (2013), http://www.emro.who.int/images/
stories/palestine/documents/WHO-RTH_crossing_barriers_to_access_health.
pdf?ua=1; WHO, BARRIERS TO HEALTH ACCESS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY, 2011 and 2012 (2013), http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/
palestine/documents/WHO_Access_Report-March_5_2013.pdf.
372. PHRI, supra note 255, at 10.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 13.
375. Id. at 10.
376. Id. at 6.
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Palestinians in Gaza.377
Overall, dependence on exit permits for health is part of the
complex permits regime in the OPT.378 Shenhav and Berda,
Israeli scholars, point out how the Israeli military
administration in the West Bank uses uncertainty and
ambiguity as a means of asserting authority and suppressing
rebellion.379 Not knowing whether you will get a permit is part
of that uncertainty. The permits regime, of which permits for
health reasons are but a part, restricts freedom of movement and
is one of the major aspects of Israel’s excessive control over the

377. WHO surveys, based on data taken from the Palestinian District
Coordination office, MoH–Gaza and the Palestinian General Authority for Civil
Affairs in Ramallah, document Israel’s responses to hundreds of thousands of
permits requests filed by patients (and companions, in the West Bank) through
the past six years. The surveys show that the overall approval rate of permits
for West Bank patients and companions improved from 77.37% in 2014 to
83.18% in 2015. As for Israel’s responses to permits requests to exit Gaza for
medical reasons, from 92.5% approval rates in 2012, the numbers dropped to
76.66% and 63.8% in 2015 and 2016. In addition, Israel’s approval of permits
steadily declined during 2016, from a high of 78.2% in January to a low of 41.7%
in December. In October 2017, 45% of the patient applications to access health
care outside Gaza were rejected. 2017 is likely to see the lowest approval rate
for patient applications to exit Gaza since the WHO began documenting them
in 2006, with an average of only 54% accepted between January and October. A
further increase relates to delayed cases, when patients were not allowed to
leave for treatment on the scheduled dates.
The rate of unanswered applications for exit permits for medical
treatment has nearly tripled over the past four years. According to the WHO,
15.4% of applications went unanswered in 2014, while in 2015 their number
reached 17.6%. By September 2017, there were 8,555 applications that
remained unanswered, accounting for 43.7% of nearly 20,000 applications.
According to “Haaretz,” 20 severely ill patients died in Gaza in 2017 after their
application for an Israeli exit permit to receive medical treatment was not
granted in time. Amira Hass, For Some Gazans in Need of Medical Treatment,
the Wait for an Exit Permit Ends in Death, HAARETZ (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-for-somesick-gazans-the-wait-for-an-exit-permit-ends-in-death-1.5627529.
WHO monthly reports on referral of patients from the Gaza Strip can
be found online. WHO Monthly Reports on Referral of Patients from the Gaza
Strip, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.emro.who.int/pse/publications-who/
monthly-referral-reports.html.
378. See BERDA, THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION, supra note 76.
379. Yehouda Shenhav & Yael Berda, The Colonial Foundations of the State
of Exception: Juxtaposing the Israeli Occupation with Colonial Bureaucratic
History, in THE POWER OF INCLUSIVE EXCLUSION 337 (Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni
& Sari Hanafi eds., 2009). See also Berda’s discussion of administrative
flexibility as part of what she calls “effective lack of efficiency,” which is part of
the creation of dependence among those governed by the occupation. BERDA,
THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION, supra note 76, at 110.
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Palestinians’ daily lives.380
d. Exit Permits: Medical Staff and Students
Cases dealing with exit permits affect the movement of
medical teams too. Some of them are part of the problem noted
above—the detachment of East Jerusalem from the West Bank.
One early case dealt with the problems that hospitals in East
Jerusalem confronted when a closure was imposed on the West
Bank and the residents they employed could not reach them.381
Following the petition, the state issued permits to essential
workers, which led to the petition being rejected.382 In another
case, the HCJ rejected the petition of a Palestinian who had
worked for fourteen years as a nurse in an East Jerusalem
hospital.383 When his entry permit to Israel expired, the army
refused to renew it for security reasons.384 After seeing the secret
files provided by the General Security Services, the HCJ
conveyed its negative impression from them to the petitioner,
who withdrew the petition.385 Another case dealt with a medical
student from Al-Quds University in the West Bank, who wanted
to enter Israel for clinical studies and training at Makassed
Hospital in East Jerusalem.386 The authorities refused him entry
on security grounds and noted that, as in many other cases,
decisions to allow entry are a privilege granted at the state’s
discretion.387 The HCJ, after reviewing the security documents
ex parte, clarified to the petitioner that he was allegedly a
member of a terrorist group, a fact that he denied.388 The HCJ
rejected the petition, noting it would expect a person choosing
380. BERDA, THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE OCCUPATION, supra note 76, at 23–
25, 57, 89.
381. HCJ 2054/96 Makassed v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Jan. 13, 1998), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
382. Id.
383. HCJ 10260/03 Shehadeh v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Mar. 1, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
384. Id.
385. Id. Similar issues came up in HCJ 0/103433 Zaban v. Commander of
the IDF Forces in the West Bank (June 8, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.) and HCJ 6846/04 Alawna v. Commander of the IDF Forces
in the West Bank (Aug. 30, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
In these cases, however, entry was ultimately allowed.
386. HCJ 11595/05 Najar v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Dec. 17, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
387. Id. ¶ d(3).
388. Id. ¶ f.
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the medical profession to avoid illegal acts and hoped for a
solution but, absent one, it would not rush to intervene in the
state’s exercise of its privilege to decide who would enter.389 The
HCJ rejected arguments founded on Israel’s duties toward the
local population (including health care under GCIV Article 56)
and determined that the provision of medical services does not
depend on any particular individual.390
Other HCJ decisions involving Gazans who requested
permits to enter the West Bank reflect a further effect of the
disengagement on health care, this time involving medical
studies. The HCJ twice rejected the petition of a group of
students who had received scholarships to study occupational
therapy in the West Bank, a course that is not available in
Gaza.391 Israel classified individuals aged sixtenn to thrty-five
as a risk group and banned their entry into the West Bank even
though, individually, they did not pose a security risk.392 The
state argued that, even if these students entered the West Bank
without any intention of engaging in terrorist activities, they
might be influenced by the surroundings.393 In its submission,
the State distinguished between the Gaza Strip, no longer being
under Israeli belligerent occupation, and the West Bank, an area
that still was, with Israel holding overall responsibility for
security.394 Israel refused to treat this as a humanitarian case
and allow the students to enter even for the two months of
clinical training needed to complete their degree, for which they
had studied online.395 In another case, which involved students
who wanted to move from the West Bank to pursue studies in
Gaza, the HCJ upheld the army’s decision based on its policy not
to allow such moves except for humanitarian reasons.396 The
HCJ noted that this position reflected Israel’s wish to separate
389. Id. ¶ f(1).
390. Id. ¶ f(2). In another case, the HCJ upheld the army’s refusal to let a
delegation of PHRI staff enter Gaza due to security concerns, in which the HCJ
chose not to intervene. HCJ 727/02 PHRI v. IDF Commander in The Gaza Strip
(May 2, 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
391. HCJ 11120/05 Hamdan v. IDF Head of Southern Command (Aug. 7,
2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). The decision reaffirmed an
earlier decision on the same matter. HCJ 7960/04 Alrazi v. IDF Commander in
The Gaza Strip (Sept. 29, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
392. Id. ¶ h.
393. Id. ¶ h.
394. Id.
395. Id. ¶ j.
396. HCJ 495/12 Azat v. Minster of Defense (Sept. 24, 2012), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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the West Bank, controlled by the PA, from the Gaza Strip,
controlled by a terrorist group.397 The state outlined to the Court
its policy that the law of belligerent occupation no longer applies
in Gaza and, therefore, Israel bears only humanitarian duties
toward its population.398 This argument again illustrates how
the disengagement allowed Israel to continue—and transform—
its control without responsibility. The State still provided details
from cases of entry into Israel from Gaza as well as entry into
Gaza on grounds other than health care.399 While describing the
situation as “almost desperate,”400 the HCJ rejected the petition;
however, one of the three presiding judges opined in a dissent
that the army should be mandated to establish a special
“exceptions committee.”401 Note that entering Israel is crucial
not only for Gazans who need to do so for medical treatment or
for study purposes, 402 but also for any Gaza resident who wishes
to travel to the West Bank or to Jordan precisely for these
reasons or for any other.
Seeing this question in the broader context of restrictions on
freedom of movement, recall that, because of the closure imposed
on Gaza’s airspace, any Gaza resident wanting to fly out from an
Israeli or a Jordanian airport must pass through Israel. Given
that the Rafah crossing to Egypt opened up only on a limited
basis throughout most of the period discussed here, and given
the distance between Gaza and Cairo that makes travel
particularly challenging for sick people, the effect of the Israeli
closure on Gaza residents has been significant. The situation is
dynamic, with new rules issued frequently.403

397. Id. ¶ d.
398. Id.
399. Id. ¶ n.
400. Id. ¶ m.
401. Id. ¶ i.
402. The effect of Israel’s closure of Gaza on people wanting to travel is
detailed in GISHA, HELD BACK: STUDENTS TRAPPED IN GAZA (2008), http://gisha.
org/UserFiles/File/Students_report_Eng-Online_Version.pdf, and in GISHA,
OBSTACLE COURSE: STUDENTS DENIED EXIT FROM GAZA (2009),
http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications_/Students2009_Report_Eng.
pdf.
403. See COGAT, supra note 295 (discussing the rules issued by the Israeli
army regarding the movement of Gaza residents, specifically, Israel’s
announcement in 2016 that it will allow Gaza residents to exit for personal
reasons providing they do not return via Israel for at least a full year).

478

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2
III.

THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND
MEDICAL TEAMS DURING MILITARY
OPERATIONS

The second major category of cases discussed by the HCJ
regarding the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT concerns
the protection of civilians and of medical teams wishing to assist
Palestinians at the time of hostilities. These cases were litigated
in real time, and the Israeli Supreme Court took what can be
described as a “managerial” position, reiterating the applicable
norms of IHL and mostly hearing from both sides, while
obtaining guarantees from the army about its actions and trying
to improve the situation on the ground. Some of these cases dealt
with the possibility of access for medical teams and the
evacuation of wounded people, with the army guaranteeing it
would abide by its IHL duties. The cases again follow the
political developments, this time the rounds of heightened
hostilities in the OPT since the early 2000s.404
During the 2002 Israeli army operation in Jenin known as
“Defensive Shield,” PHRI petitioned the HCJ. In response, the
army declared it was abiding by IHL and consequently, the
parties agreed to withdraw the petition.405 Several weeks later,
as hostilities continued, two more cases brought by PHRI came
before the HCJ, with the Israeli army allegedly firing on Red
Crescent ambulances.406 In its response, the State conceded that
the “objective situation regarding treatment of wounded
people”407 was not easy and that shots had been fired at a
Palestinian ambulance.408 However, the army claimed that
Palestinians had previously transferred explosives in
ambulances.409

404. See ZIV, supra note 6, at 57–63.
405. HCJ 1985/02 PHRI v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Mar. 5, 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
406. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Apr. 28, 2002), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 2936/02
PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (Apr. 8, 2002), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
407. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Apr. 28, 2002), ¶ 1, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
408. Id. ¶ 4.
409. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.

2018]

RIGHT TO HEALTH UNDER OCCUPATION

479

The State argued the army was nevertheless committed to
abide by its obligations under international law and had
instructed all warring forces to act accordingly.410 In one of these
cases, the HCJ noted that, given the army’s declaration of its
commitment to humanitarian rules and the instructions to the
soldiers to abide by them, the petition could be rejected.411 As for
the second case, the HCJ found that the petition was “forward
looking.”412 It cited the First Geneva Convention, which deals
with the amelioration of conditions for the wounded and the sick
among armed forces in the field,413 rather than GCIV, thus
presumably turning this into a matter related to armed forces
rather than civilians. This choice raises a host of questions about
the classification and status of Palestinian combatants.
Although, these are beyond the scope of this paper, it is
beneficial to discuss them briefly. Specifically, the HCJ cited
Articles 19, 21, 24, and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, which
prohibit attacks on fixed or mobile medical units.414 The HCJ
noted that Article 24 deals with the respect due to medical
personnel “exclusively” engaged in the search of or the collection,
transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick and in other
medical roles.415 It also cited Article 21, which determines that
the protection to which medical units are entitled may cease if
they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts
harmful to the enemy, but only after due warning has been
given, after granting reasonable time for compliance, and after
such warning has remained unheeded.416 Citing this
background, the HCJ reiterated its determination in the first of
the two twin cases, whereby abuses of medical teams by
Palestinians may require the Israeli army to prevent such
activities but does not allow broad violation of humanitarian
rules.417 The HCJ emphasized that concrete instructions should
be issued to and complied with by the combatting forces to show
commitment to humanitarian rules, and they should be
410. Id.
411. HCJ 2936/02 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Apr. 8, 2002), ¶¶ 4–5, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
412. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Apr. 28, 2002), ¶ 5, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
413. Id. ¶ 6.
414. Id. ¶ 6–8.
415. Id. ¶ 7.
416. Id. ¶ 8.
417. HCJ 2117/02 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
(Apr. 28, 2002), ¶ 9, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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“balanced” against the risks posed by the Palestinians who,
according to the Israeli army, are involved in combat while
disguised as medical teams.418
The HCJ again confronted the issue of medical teams during
Israel’s military activity in Rafah in 2004. Various human rights
groups, spearheaded by PHRI, demanded that the army allow
medical teams and ambulances to evacuate people who had been
wounded in Rafah.419 They demanded that the evacuation be
conducted without need for prior coordination with a
“humanitarian hotline” established by the army, that the
movement of medical equipment between Rafah and hospitals
outside it be allowed and medical teams or civilians who
evacuate the wounded or the dead not be hurt or threatened.420
They also demanded that supplies of electricity, water, food, and
medicine be renewed to certain areas, and that a delegation of
physicians on behalf of PHRI be allowed to visit Gaza
hospitals.421 The army argued that, since the litigation was
being conducted while hostilities were still ongoing, the HCJ
should beware of intervening, as the issue could hardly be
considered justiciable.422 The army explained that the purpose
of the operation was to prevent terrorism and these cases were
difficult as terrorists operate amidst a civilian population.423 In
its judgment, the HCJ emphasized that all the army’s combat
activities are subject to the pertinent rules of international
law.424 It also stressed that, although judicial review is usually
conducted ex post factum, in this case the judicial review
requested is ex ante, while hostilities are taking place.425 The
HCJ determined that the relevant normative framework for its
decision includes the Hague Convention, the GCIV, and
principles of Israeli administrative law binding on all Israeli
soldiers.426 It cited provisions regarding respect for protected
persons,427 and GCIV articles dealing with the supply of food,
418. Id.
419. HCJ 4764/04 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza (May 30,
2004), ¶ 4, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. ¶ 5.
423. Id. ¶ 5.
424. Id. ¶ 7.
425. HCJ 4764/04 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza (May 30,
2004), ¶ 8, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
426. Id. ¶ 11.
427. Id.
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medicine, and consignments as well as the operation of medical
bodies in the area.428 Addressing the petitioners’ specific claims,
the HCJ said it had requested and received answers from the
army on all the issues that had been raised. Among the answers,
the HCJ cited:
Medical equipment and drugs: The petitioners had argued
that the relevant hospital suffered from a serious shortage of
medications, medical equipment, and blood.429 A car with
equipment and supplies prepared by PHRI had not been allowed
to enter the area.430 In its answer, the army noted that medical
equipment and drugs are regularly allowed to enter, describing
detailed discussions conducted with the director of the hospital,
who had reported that blood supplies were no longer lacking but
the shortage of first aid equipment continued.431 The army
conveyed that Red Cross trucks had entered the area with
medications and four trucks with medical equipment had “just”
passed an Israeli crossing.432 After this account, the HCJ stated
it was the duty of the military commander to guarantee the
availability of medical equipment in the area and to ensure the
ability of local hospitals to treat patients.433 Medical equipment
should be prepared in advance for a situation of shortage and
allowed to enter the area from various sources. If possible, the
HCJ added, the army and local medical services should remain
in regular contact.434 These are duties of the military
commander, and no external agency can relieve him from them.
The HCJ then noted that, based on the facts presented, this
issue appears to be resolved now, leaving no room for judicial
intervention.435
Evacuation of injured people: The petitioners argued that
roads to Rafah were blocked and ambulance movement was
restricted.436 The army answered that it allows the entry of
ambulances and medical teams in coordination with various
bodies, arguing that some restrictions had been required
because terrorists had in the past used ambulances to transfer
428. Id. ¶ 12.
429. Id. ¶ 17.
430. Id. ¶ 17.
431. HCJ 4764/04 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza (May 30,
2004), ¶ 17, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
432. Id.
433. Id. ¶ 18.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. ¶ 21.
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combatants and weapons.437 Checking ambulances was thus
required, but the cost is a delay of only a few minutes and the
instruction is to refrain from shooting at ambulances.438 The
HCJ then stated that the normative aspect is not contested and
that the army must do everything possible to allow the
evacuation of wounded local residents.439 It also held that the
transfer of ambulances to Rafah and back had seemed proper,
instructions had been clear and unequivocal, and the petition
had been satisfied.440
Visits of medical teams: The army replied there were no
restrictions on physicians’ visits, no matter if they were from the
ICRC, or were non-Israelis working in Israeli hospitals or in the
West Bank and Gaza.441 Israeli doctors were not allowed in Gaza
(by Israel) given the risk to their security.442 The HCJ held that
the army was solely guided by security considerations about the
risks to Israelis in Gaza.443
In sum, the HCJ held that military actions in accordance
with IHL requires the reiteration of rules of behavior and the
creation of institutional tools to enable their fulfillment.444 It
remarked that, compared to the cases addressed two years
previously (cited above) much progress had seemingly been
made.445 The Court emphasized that the army played not only a
“negative” role but also a “positive” one—protecting the local
residents.446 Accordingly, military procedures must also help to
solve new problems that may arise. The HCJ favorably noted
that the army would appoint a senior officer who would be in
direct contact with the petitioning non-governmental
organizations.447
The third and so far last round of judgments issued during
hostilities dates back to 2009, during the “Cast Lead” Israeli
operation in Gaza. PHRI and other non-governmental
437. HCJ 4764/04 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza (May 30,
2004), ¶ 22, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
438. Id. ¶ 22.
439. Id. ¶ 23.
440. Id. ¶¶ 21–23.
441. Id. ¶ 32.
442. Id. ¶ 32.
443. HCJ 4764/04 PHRI v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza (May 30,
2004), ¶¶ 31–33, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
444. Id. ¶ 34.
445. Id.
446. Id.¶ 35.
447. Id. ¶ 37.
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organizations petitioned the HCJ to protest delays in the
evacuation of the injured from Gaza to hospitals, Israeli army
attacks on ambulances and medical teams, and the lack of
electricity in Gaza that undermined the functioning of hospitals,
clinics, and the water and sewage systems.448 The army, after
repeating its previous arguments regarding justiciability, noted
it had abided by IHL and had fulfilled its duties as held in the
Rafah case.449 It also noted, however, that Israel was no longer
occupying Gaza and did not have a military commander in the
area or any contact with the Hamas regime.450 Humanitarian
coordination is arranged vis-à-vis international groups and the
Palestinian civil committee in Ramallah.451 The army also
described the operational layout it had established to allow for
humanitarian assistance,452 and it noted that an order was in
place to avoid attacking medical teams fulfilling their roles
unless it was known they were being abused for combat.453
The HCJ reiterated its statement on judicial review from
previous cases, noting the difficulty of collecting reliable data
while belligerencies continue. In such cases, it said, the Court’s
judicial review focused on sustaining the applicable
international legal norms and those from Israeli administrative
law.454 It cited the normative framework of armed conflict,
leaving open (as it had in some of the exit permit cases discussed
above) the question of the relevance of occupation law to Gaza
and naming sources similar to those cited in previous cases.455
After considering the army’s description of the humanitarian
apparatus it had set up, the HCJ said it hoped it would fulfill the
army’s duties under IHL, which the army had not denied.456 The
HCJ was also satisfied that the army had tried to fix the
problems affecting the supply of electricity, food, and

448. HCJ 201/09 PHRI & Gisha - Legal Center for Freedom of Movement v.
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Jan. 19, 2009), ¶¶ 5–6, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
449. Id. ¶ 7.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. ¶ 8.
453. Id. ¶ 9.
454. HCJ 201/09 PHRI & Gisha - Legal Center for Freedom of Movement v.
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Jan. 19, 2009), ¶ 13, Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
455. Id. ¶¶ 14–21 (citing to GCIV arts. 16, 18–26, 30 and AP1 arts. 8, 12–16,
70).
456. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
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medicine.457
Empirical studies exceeding the scope of this article are
needed to discern how much the litigation in all these cases
affected reality on the ground. Except for the question of
whether duties incumbent on the occupier continue to apply in
Gaza, there was no controversy in these cases concerning the
applicable norms on the one hand, and the “facts” on the ground
while litigation was ongoing on the other. The role of the HCJ,
in its own perception, was limited to declaring the norms while
encouraging the army to act toward their implementation and
ease humanitarian relief under its aegis.458 These cases raise
complex questions about the role of the HCJ in these situations:
Is it ameliorative? Does it force the army to recall IHL duties it
would have neglected otherwise? To what extent are the letter
and spirit of IHL duties preserved in reality, given the many
reports of violations, and what role, if any, did the HCJ
determination play on effecting this?
No petitions were submitted to the HCJ during the latest
round of hostilities in Gaza in 2014, even if attacks on medical
personnel and medical facilities, including hospitals, were
reported. Reports on the 2014 conflict also pointed to the failure
of the coordination mechanism for injured people, which
sometimes took ten hours instead of ten minutes and, in some
cases, took seven or eight days or failed altogether.459 These
reports of violations in the most recent round do raise questions
about the effect of the litigation in previous rounds on army
policies
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The litigation concerning the right to health in the OPT
brings up questions very different from those raised in domestic
litigation. This litigation has mostly dealt with physical access
to health care and with the problems resulting from restrictions
on freedom of movement within and outside the OPT, while some
cases have focused on protection during hostilities. A great deal
of litigation that was not specifically focused on access, however,
is relevant to matters affecting health care. These matters

457. Id. ¶ 26.
458. Id. ¶ 7.
459. JUTTA BACHMANN ET AL., GAZA 2014: FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT
MEDICAL FACT-FINDING MISSION 44–51 (2014).
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include, for example, allowing Israel to reduce the supply of
electricity and fuel to Gaza to the humanitarian minimum,460
the rights of Palestinian prisoners and forced feeding of hunger
strikers,461 and extensive individual litigation about who is
considered a “resident” of East Jerusalem and hence of Israel,
consequently entitled to access to Israel’s National Health
Insurance.462 Often, this litigation did not result in a court
judgment but in some sort of ad hoc response, frequently in the
form of an out-of-court settlement.
The HCJ has tended to elude questions of principle,
especially regarding the status of Gaza and Israel’s duties in its
regard, favoring instead pragmatic solutions. As noted in the
cases concerning the checkpoints and the wall, the HCJ refused
to endorse an overall perspective, such as the one adopted by the
ICJ, and addressed only local, specific cases, even when
providing a localized remedy, thereby legitimizing the regime as
such.463 Litigation before the HCJ concerning exit permits seems
to have played a significant role in the shaping of the army’s
procedures, especially regarding the West Bank, probably
because this was the one area where the HCJ did agree to deal
with a general petition. The result was the bureaucratic permits
regime discussed above. Regarding post-disengagement Gaza,
the picture is different because the HCJ has generally accepted
the position that Israel does not have the duties of an occupier
towards its residents. Although in many of these cases the HCJ
460. See, e.g., HCJ 4258/08 Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement v.
Minister of Defense (June 5, 2008), (Isr.); HCJ 07/9132 Al-Bassiouni v. Prime
Minister and Defense Minister of Israel (Jan. 30, 2008), (Isr.). The continuing
electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip, fueled by disagreements between Hamas and
the PA and a lack of any operative steps taken by Israel on the matter, has led
to eighteen to twenty-hour power cuts a day, placing an increasing burden on
health facilities in Gaza. Electricity fluctuations have damaged medical
equipment, with over 150 medical machines currently out of order. The
electricity crisis is also affecting acceptable standards for collecting, storing, and
transporting blood. With funding from the Central Emergency Relief Fund
(CERF) and other donors, life-saving services have been maintained. See
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO SPECIAL SITUATION REPORT GAZA,
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY OCTOBER TO NOVEMBER (2017).
461. See, e.g., HCJ 452/16 Al-Kik v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West
Bank (Feb. 16, 2016), (Isr.); HCJ 7837/04 Adalah v. Prison Service & the
Minister of Public Security (Sep. 14, 2004), (Isr.).
462. See, e.g., Labor Court (Jer.) 98/1241 Samar Abu-Sanina v. Social
Security – Jerusalem (Aug. 27, 2002), (Isr.); Labor Court Appeal 1394/02 Samar
Abu-Sanina v. Social Security (Mar. 16, 2004), (Isr.); Civil Request (Jer.)
1280/06 Zahada Hussina v. Social Security (Apr. 6, 2006) (Isr.).
463. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE (2002); Shamir,
supra note 196.
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said it would sidestep issues of principle on the status of Gaza
and Israel’s duties, it did, in fact, adopt the state’s position,464
while still attempting to prod the state to adopt measures based
on humanitarian grounds rather than on rights or duties.
In cases concerning hostilities, the HCJ cited the
overarching applicable norms from IHL usually missing from
the freedom of movement cases, but at times declaring norms
more than actually examining the scope of their implementation.
This approach can be understood in a wider context—given
Israel’s denial of the applicability of GCIV to the OPT and the
HCJ’s doubts about its enforceability,465 the HCJ finds it easier
to address IHL norms on belligerency than norms on occupation.
Although the HCJ does often engage with the law of occupation,
it does so more easily with the Hague Regulations than with the
Geneva
Convention,
perhaps
clarifying
the
latter’s
disappearance from most of the cases that bring up health duties
as an occupier rather than as a belligerent party.
The notion of access to health care that was developed in
international human rights law is relevant in these cases, and
the HCJ determined that human rights law applies in the OPT
alongside IHL. Nevertheless, the HCJ never turned to
international human rights law on the right to health in such
cases, although occasionally referred to the right to health
generally and without citing specific sources. The content of the
right to health as outlined above, focusing on accessibility as a
significant component, could and should have highlighted the
effect of physical restrictions on the violation of this right.
Moreover, even when applying IHL, the HCJ hardly turned to
specific norms within it, although it did so in cases of protection
during hostilities. The disappearance of international human
rights considerations, including the limited turn to IHL, points
to the prevalent form of analysis, especially in the Gaza cases.
This analysis hinges on humanitarianism, in the sense of
humanitarian gestures rather than of binding obligations
derived from IHL, instead of on rights and duties. Law is more
often absent than present, and the HCJ seems to favor
pragmatic solutions, or no solution at all, rather than holdings
based on principles.

464. HCJ 07/9132 Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister and Defense Minister of
Israel (Jan. 30, 2008), (Isr.) (adopting this position generally regarding Gaza).
465. See KRETZMER, supra note 463; GROSS, supra note 4.
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The issues usually raised in courts where health rights are
litigated did not feature in the cases before the HCJ reviewed
here, probably because they do not pertain to the Israeli
authorities but to Palestinian (and international) bodies
providing health care in the OPT. Nor have the occupation’s
more subtle detrimental effects on health care been a subject of
litigation. These effects touch on the social and economic
conditions created by the occupation and their long-term effect,
but also on the violence of the occupation. Other issues that did
become the subject of litigation—such as the legitimacy of the
types of weapons used by Israel,466 or of “targeted killings” and
their collateral effect,467 have a bearing on the life and health of
Palestinians in the OPT, who may die or be injured because of
these policies. Focusing on access to health care, then, as this
Article did here, tells only a small part of the story of occupation,
law, and health. Indeed, adjudication dealing with the conduct
of hostilities in the OPT, even beyond that directly touching on
the protection of medical teams and provisions of medical
treatment, is no less relevant to the health of Palestinians living
under occupation.
But even regarding access to health care, we should
acknowledge the limits of studying it through litigation. Paul
Farmer points to the need for rethinking health and human
rights in a way that will not pin all the hopes on legal battles
and will instead shift to a paradigm of political solidarity and,
pragmatically, to the provision of services for those in need.468
Farmer says that a real transfer of money, food, and drugs is
needed, rather than more litigation.469 In the present case, this

466. HCJ 8990/02 PHRI v. IDF Southern Command (Apr. 27, 2003), (Isr.)
(concerning the legality of using flechette guns).
467. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Dec. 14,
2006), (Isr.).
468. PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 213 (2003).
469. Id. See also Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau, Rethinking Health and
Human Rights: Time for a Paradigm Shift, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655–66
(2002). For other sources on the limits of right to health litigation when bigger
problems are involved, see Lucie White, “If You Don’t Pay, You Die”: On Death
and Desire in the Postcolony, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS 57, 72 (Daphne
Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). See generally Jeremy Perelman &
Lucie E. White, Stones of Hope: Experience and Theory in African Economic and
Social Rights Activism, in STONES OF HOPE 149–71 (2011) (discussing robust
social rights practice that uses litigation but does not privilege it and engages
multiple public actors in every domain of state power, including both private
and state actors).

488

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2

approach also pertains to the gap between the Palestinian and
Israeli health systems as well as to the structural gaps (or, in
Farmer’s term, the structural violence) at the heart of the
issue.470 In Farmer’s words, human rights violations are not
accidents but symptoms of deeper pathologies of power, and they
are intimately linked to the social conditions that so often
determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from
harm.471 Another factor to consider when addressing the limits
of a litigation perspective is access to justice. Lack of access to
the legal system or to lawyers, for reasons such as knowledge,
means, and others, may indicate that litigation presents only
part of the problem, without covering those who did not make it
even to the threshold of the law.
Haaretz journalist Amira Hass, who has documented the
effects of restrictions on freedom of movement and their effect on
health care,472 noted that Israeli authorities use the term
“humanitarian” to describe their intervention in a way that
allows them to beg the more rigorous questions surrounding the
suppression of human rights.473 As Eyal Weizman, a professor at
the University of London, points out, “humanitarian” has
become the most commonly used adjective in matters of
occupation design, with the army using such terms as
“humanitarian terminals” and “humanitarian officers” in
reference to checkpoints.474 Weizman describes how, in recent
decades, governments have begun to describe their own projects
as “humanitarian” and to use the term in any connection related
to the provision of aid, including medical aid, even when
undertaken by military or state agencies.475 At first glance, this
description aligns with David Kennedy’s, a Harvard Law School
professor, analysis of how, within humanitarian law, the
humanitarians and the army often speak the same language,

470. FARMER, supra note 468, at 8–9, 230–31.
471. Id. at 7.
472. AMIRA HASS, DRINKING THE SEA AT GAZA: DAYS AND NIGHTS IN A LAND
UNDER SIEGE 236–63 (1996).
473. Hass also noted that none of the refusals she documented had to do with
security. Id. at 263.
474. EYAL WEIZMAN, HOLLOW LAND: ISRAEL’S ARCHITECTURE OF
OCCUPATION 149–53 (2007). On the effects of degrading environmental
conditions on water, hygiene, nutrition, and health care as potentially leading
to preventable deaths that are not recorded when only deaths due to violence or
hunger related causes are counted, see EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL
POSSIBLE EVILS: HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO GAZA 86 (2012).
475. WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS, supra note 474, at 51.
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since modern humanitarian law provides a professional
vocabulary about objectives and means that civilized people can
use to discuss military violence.476 Military commanders and
humanitarians, says Kennedy, assess acts of violence from a
similar vantage point and thus reinforce one another’s
professionalism.477 Kennedy’s analysis pertains to the place of
humanitarian lawyers and advocates vis-à-vis the military.478
However, we should also note that while advocates for
Palestinian health rights often use a language of rights, be they
anchored in IHL or in international human rights law, many of
the court judgments resort to a humanitarian language that is
often “humanitarian without the law.” Courts may adopt an IHL
means-ends proportionality analysis that actually obscures the
wider picture of structural violence, inequality, and domination.
These questions have tended to remain outside the judicial
realm, though their effect on the right to health in its fullest
sense has been critical. These HCJ decisions share with the
military the language of proportionality without attempting to
look in-depth at the structure of the occupation and without
questioning the nature and legitimacy of the army’s concept of
“security.” This humanitarianism, to borrow Kennedy’s analysis,
participates in the occupation machine.479
Frequently, however, humanitarian is not used in its
denotation in IHL but as in humanitarianism, i.e. action that is
done out of humanitarian concern and not IHL duty. As
presented throughout this Article, in many of the cases
pertaining to the right to health of Palestinians in the OPT, the
HCJ has hardly made any reference to this right as a human
right in international law and rarely mentioned specific
obligations under IHL. Israeli courts tend to deal with OPT
476. On the role of proportionality in humanitarianism, see DAVID
KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM 235–323 (2005).
477. Id. at 266–68.
478. See id.
479. See id. at 316–23 (discussing humanitarian campaigns). For an
understanding of various alleviations in the name of humanitarianism as part
of the occupation regime in general and particularly of the barrier, see Ariella
Azoulay & Adi Ophir, The Monster’s Tail, in AGAINST THE WALL 2, 23 (Michael
Sorkin ed., 2005). On the Israeli army’s use of humanitarian discourse when
dealing with checkpoints and the wall, see WEIZMAN, HOLLOW LAND, supra note
474, at 143–259, 174–75. See also WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS,
supra note 474, at 3–4 (discussing how humanitarianism, human rights, and
IHL, when abused by the state, have become the crucial means by which the
economy of violence is calculated and managed).
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Palestinians’ access to health care mainly as a humanitarian
issue—again, not in the sense of binding obligations from IHL
but in the sense of a humanitarian gesture—rather than as a
matter raising questions of rights and duties. The
humanitarianism of the army described by Hass and Weizmann
seems to coalesce with the logic of these HCJ’s judgments.
At the heart of the matter, then, is the occupation regime
per se. Its health dimension reflects the larger structures of
domination, the restrictions on freedom of movement, and the
different regimes that populations living in the same area are
subject to, including, in the present context, different health
regimes. Israelis have access to the stronger Israeli health
system, with the personal application of the NHIL to the
settlers, and Palestinians in the OPT are excluded from it.
Together with other factors, these circumstances lead to
significant gaps between Israelis and Palestinians from the OPT
in the health indicators and social determinants of health.480 Of
course, the data for Israel includes Israeli settlers in the OPT
whereas the data for the OPT applies only to the Palestinians.
A recent report from PHRI Israel, which detailed this data,
argued that pointing only to Israel’s specific responsibilities is
no longer possible and full equality between Israelis and
Palestinians must be demanded.481 At the time of writing,
however, we seem to be far from such equality, and the litigation
described in this article proceeds against the background of this
inequality. Behind the legal accounts are the human stories of
people who suffered, and sometimes died, because they could not
access medical care on time. These people find themselves
between the bureaucracy of the occupation on one hand and
“proportionality” analysis on the other, with only
“humanitarianism” rather than rights on their side.
Bureaucratic procedures and proportionality analysis share an
image of professional decision-making but, underlying them, is
a regime of structural violence. As key features of the access to
480. For example, the rate of infant mortality in the OPT is 18.8 per 1000
births v. 3.7 in Israel. EFRAT, supra note 16, at 3. The rate of maternal deaths
is 28 per 100,000 in the OPT v. 7 in Israel. Id. Additionally, the average life
expectancy in the OPT is about ten years lower than in Israel. Id. There are 1.6
times more doctors to serve the population in Israel than in the OPT and only
0.125 as many specialists in the OPT as in Israel. Id. at 3–4, 19–41. See
generally Rita Giacaman et al., Health Status and Health Services in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 373 LANCET 837 (Mar. 7, 2009) (providing
additional health statistics in occupied Palestine).
481. EFRAT, supra note 16, at 5.
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health care and the law regulating it, bureaucracy and
proportionality together with “humanitarian” acts may help to
improve the situation for many Palestinians, as evident in the
high percentage of approvals for exit permits requests. However,
as discussed above, this percentage has been dropping, with
delays and refusals leading to death in some cases. This Article
points to the very idea that Palestinians are dependent on the
discretion of Israeli military bureaucracy and are subject to its
failures, rather than being accorded the human right of access
to health care and to freedom of movement. This very problem is
the core issue that appears to be beyond what litigation can
change.

